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Abstract
In the first chapter of this thesis, I study Japanese municipal mergers using a polit-
ical coalition formation model. Political coalition formation games can describe the
formation and dissolution of nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments,
the establishment of political parties, and other similar phenomena. These games
have been studied from a theoretical perspective, but the models have not been used
extensively in empirical work. This paper presents a method of estimating polit-
ical coalition formation models with many-player coalitions, and then applies this
method to the recent heisei municipal amalgamations in Japan to estimate struc-
tural coefficients that describe the behaviour of municipalities. The method enables
counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese case shows that the national govern-
ment could increase welfare via a counter-intuitive policy involving transfers to richer
municipalities conditional on their participation in a merger.
In the second chapter, I examine selection effects in the cross-country state sys-
tem. The countries present today are only part of a larger set of potential countries.
Since many modern states originated as colonies, colonial data can be used to exam-
ine correlates of independence. During decolonization, larger and more economically
successful colonies were more likely to become independent. This selection effect may
explain why, despite commonly held opinions about efficiencies of scale, small coun-
tries appear to have higher GDP both in terms of growth and levels. The estimated
selection model implies that analysing only currently independent countries can intro-
duce substantial selection bias. An example of this is presented with the Frankel and
Romer trade-instrument regression, where the selection effect biases the coefficient on
the instrument upwards, and a regression on an unselected sample yields a negative
and statistically insignificant coefficient.
In the third chapter, I examine the endogeneity of linguistic fragmentation, as-
suming that national borders have already been fixed. Users of ethnic fragmentation
indices generally assume that fragmentation is constant and exogenous. In many
countries, however, linguistic fragmentation has decreased a great deal over the past
two centuries, and frequently-used measures of ethnic fragmentation rely heavily on
linguistic differences to distinguish ethnic groups. Previous qualitative research sug-
gests that linguistic homogenization is correlated with administrative centralization.
This hypothesis is tested empirically using the population of the largest city in each
country in 1900 as a proxy for centralization, along with the population of the country
as a whole and its surface area. Using these proxies produces a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between centralization and linguistic homogenization. Furthermore,
when these variables are included in regressions predicting economic growth the co-
efficient on fragmentation is halved and becomes statistically insignificant. Similar
results are obtained when the relationship between fragmentation and corruption is
examined.
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Chapter 1
Political Mergers as Coalition
Formation
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, issues surrounding political coalition formation have attracted con-
siderable interest from both theorists and policy makers. For example, Alesina and
Spolaore [1997] examine from a theoretical perspective what size of countries will
form under different conditions. The formation and dissolution of countries can be
seen as a political coalition formation game, with coalitions consisting of residents of
a geographic are. This coalition formation game has obvious practical relevance: the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, current conflicts in Georgia, and possible de facto reunifica-
tion of the island of Cyprus all involve decisions about how many countries ought to
exist and where borders should be drawn. Similarly, the formation of a government
also corresponds to a political coalition formation game, with the political parties
being the players. Moreover, the parties themselves can be viewed as resulting from
an underlying political coalition formation game, this time with individual legislators
as the players forming the coalitions. Once again the practical importance of un-
derstanding these types of political coalition formation games is borne out by recent
news: in the 2007 Belgian national elections it was not obvious even long after the
election which parties would form a coalition government, and in Canada in 2005 the
defection of members of parliament temporarily saved the government from collapse.
In some of these cases it is possible to change the rules governing the coalition
formation game, with new rules leading to a different and more efficient coalition
structure. Any analysis of how changes in the rules will affect the coalition structure
requires knowledge of the underlying structural parameters and an understanding of
the process of coalition formation given various possible sets of rules. For example,
a recent proposal in Canada was that members of parliament should be required to
stand for a by-election if changing their party affiliation between general elections.
Had this rule been in force during recent parliaments, different coalition structures
might have resulted, leading to different governments and different policy outcomes.
Similarly, different laws regarding how municipalities can cooperate to provide public
goods, or how farmers can establish agricultural cooperatives, could lead to very
different coalition structures with very different welfare implications. If so, then
it is important to make sure that the "right" law is in place. In order to predict
the results of different laws, however, it is first necessary to develop a model of the
behaviour of the players participating in the coalition formation game, and then use
this model to predict the changes in behaviour that would result from the imposition
of a different set of laws. Although models of coalition formation date back at least to
von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944], relatively few empirical papers have made use
of such models, and in general these papers have not examined the effect of possible
changes in the rules of the coalition formation game being studied.' There is no
immediately obvious estimation strategy for these coalition formation models, since
neither existence nor uniqueness of a stable coalition structure is guaranteed.
This paper presents a method of estimating the structural parameters of a politi-
cal coalition formation model. The method is then applied to a recent set of Japanese
municipal mergers (the heisei daigappei), where the national government fixed a set of
transfer policies and individual municipalities chose, given these policies, what merger
1Desirable properties of some specific forms of coalition formation games, such as two-sided
matching games, have led to extensive empirical study of those game forms [Roth, 2008]. Empirical
research on general coalition formation models has also been limited by computational feasibility:
the number of coalition structures increases exponentially with the number of players.
if any they wished to participate in. The parameters that determine municipal pref-
erences over mergers are estimated, and these estimates are then used to predict the
effect of alternative national government transfer policies. The heisei mergers are
particularly attractive from a modelling perspective, as government policy allowed
mergers to occur only during 1996-2006, and thus the resulting coalition structure
can plausibly be treated as the outcome of a single period coalition formation game.2
Furthermore, the mergers are of interest from a policy perspective, since due to effi-
ciencies of scale the smaller municipalities spend over $10,000 per capita providing the
same services that larger municipalities provide for slightly over $1,000, and almost
all of this difference was being subsidized by the national government. Overall, then,
the paper makes two contributions: first, the method of analysing political coalition
formation games, and second, the specific results of this analysis in the Japanese case.
The methodological contribution consists of the use of simulated maximum likeli-
hood estimation to obtain structural parameters describing players' preferences over
coalitions when the observed coalition structure can be treated as the outcome of
a cooperative form hedonic coalition formation game with non-transferable utility.
Two ways of overcoming problems related to non-existence or mulitiplicity of stable
coalition structures are presented. First, all players are assumed to have the same
preferences over coalitions, resulting in the existence of a unique stable coalition struc-
ture [Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988].3 A second and distinct strategy is to allow players'
preferences over coalitions to differ, but restrict the types of blocking coalitions that
can form. This guarantees existence but not uniqueness of a stable coalition struc-
2In general, a problem with applying political coalition formation models to observed data is that
political coalitions once formed tend to persist, and changes that do occur are often separated by
large time periods. The extremely high cost of any realignment means that the stability of existing
borders does not provide much information, and it is not clear what it means for there to be a "sta-
ble" coalition structure, if changes to this structure occur over time at a slow but constant rate. The
Japanese data used in this paper mostly avoids this problem. The fiscal crisis of the 1990s precipi-
tated such significant changes in intergovernmental transfers that in many cases the old municipal
borders were effectively untenable, thus leading to a very large number of mergers during the window
when mergers were allowed. Furthermore, during the 1970-1995 period, national policy had made
municipal mergers extremely unattractive, and thus boundaries remained effectively unchanged even
though demographic changes were rendering these boundaries increasingly inefficient.
3More specifically, players differ only in that different potential coalitions contain different players,
and the players may have different baseline utility levels. This technique has been used previously
by Gordon and Knight [2006].
ture [Ray and Vohra, 1997], and thus estimation requires an additional assumption
regarding which one of the set of stable coalition structures is actually selected. The
advantages of this approach, however, are that the distributional assumption required
on idiosyncratic preferences is less restrictive and a wider variety of covariates can be
included in the specification.
This method is then applied to the case of Japanese municipal mergers. Following
Alesina and Spolaore [1997], there are economies of scale in the production of public
goods, but also benefits to having local policies specifically tailored to match local
preferences. This tradeoff creates an optimal size for municipalities, but pre-existing
borders may not create municipalities of this size. These preferences over munici-
pal characteristics imply preferences over coalitions, and the parameters determining
these preferences are estimated by applying the method just described to data on the
mergers that actually occurred, with the functional form and some parameters for
the cost of providing services derived from existing national government estimates.
Geographical features of the data allow the set of possible coalitions to be reduced to
the point where the model is computationally tractable.
The estimated parameters show that, as expected, municipalities prefer to be in
coalitions that offer higher levels of public goods and have lower population. There are
some differences between the two methods of estimation: the estimated magnitude
of the aversion to amalgamation is higher when all municipalities are assumed to
have the same preferences over coalitions, and the preference for high income fellow
residents lower. The methods of estimation yield estimates for the optimal population
of municipalities of 75,000 or 150,000. The stated goal of the municipal mergers was
to reduce the number of municipalities to 1000, and given the population of Japan
(about 125 million) this implies that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had an average
population target of about 125,000. If, across Japan, the average level of spending on
municipal services is optimal, then a resident is willing to pay about 0.5% of income
to cut the population of their municipality in half.
In non-transferable utility coalition formation games, there are often coalitions
that, if formed, would increase the utility of some players by large amounts, but
these coalitions do not form because some other participants in the coalition would
end up with slightly lower utility. Thus, national government intervention could lead
to different and better coalition structures forming. The structural parameters that
have been estimated are used to examine the effects of two counterfactual policies.
First, the possibility of national government enforcement of transfers is considered,
where the national government allows decentralized negotiations over these transfers
to take place between municipalities. In this case, where the game is converted
into a transferable-utility game, the outcome depends on the bargaining power of
different types of municipalities. While this policy increases the number mergers
that occur, it also leads to potentially very large transfers from poor municipalities
to richer ones, and the exact amount of the transfers cannot be known in advance
without knowing the bargaining method by which municipalities divide the benefits of
a merger. Even under the most optimistic assumptions regarding bargaining power,
the poorest municipalities end up worse off than under the original policy.
Next, an alternative is considered where the national government provides a finan-
cial incentive for municipalities to participate in mergers. This policy results in higher
utility for both poor and rich municipalities. In fact, even if incentives to participate
in mergers are only offered to richer municipalities, a budget-balanced conditional
transfer policy results in higher utility, equivalent on average to an increase in income
of 0.3%, at the 5th through 95th percentiles. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive
as the problem the national government was attempting to solve was the high cost of
supporting small, poor municipalities. The result is consistent with theory, however,
since a regressive conditional transfer - taxing everyone and transferring money to
the residents of richer municipalities that participate in mergers - provides an incen-
tive for richer municipalities to merge with their neighbours, who then benefit from
higher levels of public goods. The very poorest municipalities, however, consisting of
approximately 5% of the population, are made slightly worse off by this scheme, since
they are never considered as potential merger partners by the richer municipalities.
The richest municipalities, consisting of a similar fraction of the population, are simi-
larly made worse off because they never participate in mergers but pay the additional
tax. Providing an incentive to richer municipalities mimics the transfers that the
municipalities themselves offered in the transferable utility game, but with amounts
that are not as large. Thus, fewer mergers occur, but the poorer municipalities are
on average better off than in the transferable utility case because they do not have
to pay huge transfers to richer municipalities.4
The major contribution of this paper is to develop an empirical framework for the
estimation of political coalition formation models that takes into account theoreti-
cal characteristics of solutions and allows for the analysis of counterfactual policies.
This is an advance over previous techniques: the closest related work is Gordon and
Knight [2006], which uses a method of moments estimator to examine mergers be-
tween pairs of school districts. The maximum likelihood estimator presented below,
however, has the advantage that the stable coalition structure does not need to be
computed repeatedly as part of the estimation process. This makes it possible to
consider coalitions much larger than size 2. Another closely related paper is Brasing-
ton [2003], which uses a maximum likelihood estimator, but considers each potential
pairwise merger in isolation from other potential mergers.5 In addition, other recent
empirical political coalition formation papers, such as Alesina et al. [2004], focus on
describing patterns that are observed in political boundaries, while this paper esti-
mates structural parameters and predicts how counterfactual policies would change
the set of boundaries forming. 6 With suitable modifications, the method used in this
4 This result is related to the theory presented by Armstrong and Vickers [2007] regarding anti-
trust regulation of corporate mergers; however, in the Armstrong and Vickers model, the cost of
allowing certain mergers to happen is that other, better, mergers do not occur, whereas in the model
presented below, the primary cost of having more mergers occur is the ever larger transfers to richer
municipalities that must be provided. The transferable utility case thus has "too many" mergers, at
least for some social welfare functions.
5 The restriction to pairwise mergers follows from the use of the Poirier [1980] bivariate probit
model. In models of the type used by Brasington and others, the probability that players 1 and 2
will form a coalition is unaffected by the other options that 1 or 2 might have. The method presented
below and that used by Gordon and Knight appear to be the only ones that take into account that
the presence of a player 3 and an attractive {1, 3} coalition may disrupt a {1, 2} coalition that
would otherwise form.
'Brasington [2003], Alesina et al. [2004], and most of the other existing empirical studies of po-
litical mergers focus on American school districts. Miceli [1993], the earliest example yet found,
examines the trade-off that Connecticut school districts faced between efficiencies of scale and lo-
cally optimal education quality. Alesina et al. [2004] use a much larger dataset, and examine the
relationship between county-level heterogeneity and the number of school districts and other local
paper could be applied to other types of coalition formation games, possibly in other
fields as well as in political economy.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The general estimation strategy
is presented in Section 2, including both the version imposing a restriction on the
form of players' preferences and the version using instead a restriction on the types of
blocking coalitions. The use of this strategy in the Japanese case is then described in
Section 3, and potential alternative national government policies are analysed using
counterfactual simulations in Section 4.
1.2 Theory
Notation follows that of Banerjee et al. [2001] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002].
Specifically, let N be the set of players, and S C N a coalition of these players. IH is
the set of all possible coalition structures, where a coalition structure 7 e H is a set
of coalitions {S 1,..., SK} such that every player is in exactly one of these coalitions.
Suppose that player i E N has preferences _i defined over the set {S c Ni e S}, with
-<i indicating a strict preference. The extension of these preferences to partitions is
easy: if 7(i) is the coalition that municipality i belongs to in partition r, then ir i 7r'
if 7r(i) - 7'(i). Let r -<s 7' for some coalition S if Vi E S, 7r -i w' and at least one of
these preferences is strict. The observed coalition structure is treated as the result of
a "hedonic coalition formation game", where the payoff to each player depends only
on the coalition to which it belongs, and not on what other coalitions occur. This is
the "hedonic aspect" introduced by Dreze and Greenberg [1980], except without the
possibility of transfers. The inability to negotiate transfers prevents some coalitions
from forming:
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2}, and ui be a utility function describing the preferences
jurisdictions. While the estimates in each of these papers imply a type of coalition formation game,
they do not present an explicit coalition formation model.
of player i over coalitions, with
ul({1, 2}) -- ul({1}) + E
u 2 ({1, 2})- u2 ({2}) + E2
If E1 > 0, E2 < 0, 1 11 > |€2|, then the stable coalition structure is {{1,2} if transfers
are possible, but ff{{1}, [2}} if they are prohibited.
Ideally, given a set of preferences, there would exist a unique stable partition:
First, the solution set is defined using the von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]
"stable set":
Definition 1. ]HVNM is a stable set with respect to (I1, <) for some binary operator
<if
1. 7r, 7' E IIVNM where - < r' (Internal stability)
2. Vr 0 II VNM, 3.' E IIVNM where - < 7' (External stability)
The goal is to define < in a way that is intuitively plausible yet at the same time
guarantees that the stable set exists, but this turns out not to be trivial. Consider,
for example, the following definition of <: 7 < 7' if 3S E -F' such that 7r -<s 7r'
and VS' E (7r \ 7'), (S' \ S) E 7' or is empty. Unfortunately, with this definition not
only is a stable set not guaranteed to exist, but in general it is not possible to devise
another plausible method of selecting a single partition as the solution of this type
of coalition formation game [Barbera and Gerber, 2007]. The following "roommates
problem" illustrates this point:
Example 2 (Gale and Shapley 1962). Suppose N = {1, 2, 3} and preferences are
{1, 2, 3} -1 {1} -'1 {1, 3} -1 {1, 2}
{1, 2, 3} -<2 {2} <2 {1, 2} <2 {2, 3}
{1, 2, 3} -3 {3} -3 {2, 3} -<s {1, 3}
With these preferences, no stable partition exists.
Nevertheless, when the Japanese municipalities actually played a coalition for-
mation game, an outcome did occur. The problem is then how to treat observed
outcomes such as this one when attempting to estimate parameters. There are at
least three ways to proceed: to move to a non-cooperative game structure, to restrict
preferences, or to relax the requirements for stability.
A non-cooperative game is guaranteed to provide a set of equilibrium outcomes,
but it is difficult to use in this case as no information is available about the way in
which the municipalities actually negotiated, or who made what offers, and so forth.
Thus, the specification of the rules of the game would be essentially arbitrary. If
the equilibria did not depend on the rules, then the lack of information about the
negotiation process would not be important, but it is fairly easy to see that in this sort
of coalition formation game, different rules produce different outcomes. For example,
if there are a finite number of periods in which a proposer can propose a coalition or
coalition structure, then the probability with which various municipalities are selected
to be the proposer will change the types of proposals made and accepted. Radically
different parameter estimates could be obtained by using different probabilities of
having a municipality selected as proposer, and there is no information available
on what reasonable proposer weights would be, or even whether the proposer type
framework is appropriate. Thus, non-cooperative form games will not be used as
part of the estimation strategy. The other two potential solutions given above will be
used, however. First, preferences will be restricted so as to ensure that a unique stable
partition exists. Second, a more general utility function will be used, but certain types
of deviations will not be allowed. This ensures the existence of a stable partition, but
not its uniqueness, and so estimation becomes somewhat more complicated.
1.2.1 Restricted Preferences Approach
Consider the following restriction on the form of ui, the utility that player i derives
from a coalition, with v being a function of characteristics Xs of S, taking parameters
u(S) = u(S) + a
(S) = v(Xs; 0) + E
The econometrician observes Xs and knows the functional form of v, and the
objective is to estimate the parameters 0. The error term es is of a known distribution.
The important restriction here is that if S -i S' then Vj, S -j S'. That is, all agents
have identical preferences over coalitions.
Theorem 1 (Farrell and Scotchmer 1988). If all agents have identical preferences
over coalitions, a generically unique stable partition exists.
Proof. The unique stable partition can be constructed as follows:
0. Let Vo be the set of all potential coalitions, and start with 7r = 0 and k = 0
1. Find Smax such that VS E Vk, u(S) < u(Smax)
2. Set 7k + 1 = 7k U {Sax} and Vk+1 = {SIS E Vk , Sn Sax = 0}
3. If Vk+ 1 # 0, repeat from 1.
This restriction on the idiosyncratic error term is strong: it implies that all the
unobserved characteristics of a coalition are enjoyed equally by all its members. For
example, in the case of municipal mergers, it rules out the possibility that a large
municipality merging with a smaller neighbour might take advantage of its dominance
on the new amalgamated municipal council in order to geographically skew public
spending. The major benefit of placing this restriction on the error term is that it
guarantees uniqueness, and thus estimation does not require any assumption about
an equilibrium selection rule.7
7It may be possible to weaken the restrictions on the error term somewhat in the future by instead
assuming the monotonic median voter property Acemoglu et al. [2008].
Suppose that partition 7ro is actually observed. The parameters 0 can be estimated
via simulated maximum likelihood. The likelihood of 7ro occurring is
£(7o stable 10)= I(wo stable 10, E)f(E)d
= P(7o stable 0, o)f, o)do
where f is the PDF of the idiosyncratic shocks, and Eo denotes the vector {es S E wo }. s
This integral can be numerically approximated by taking a set Eo of random draws
of co and calculating
1 P(7o stable 0, co)
IEol oEEo
Because of the "convenient error partitioning" [Train, 1995] of the above, the proba-
bility can be expanded into a product of independent events. 9 Let V be the set of all
potential coalitions. Then
P(7o stable 10, o) = I P(u(S') < max u(S)Eo, 0)
S'eV SEperps,
where perps, = {SIS E 7o, S S' 0} is the set of "perpetrators" necessary to
8More formally, define e1 as the 6 shocks not in co, and note that f,(E) = f(C1,E)
fE lEo(El 6o)fo (60). Then rewrite
£(wo stable 10)= f I(ro stable 19, e1, Eo)fe(61, o)dEidEo
= 1 I(ro stable 10, 1,co)fEL. I o(liEo)fo(Co)dEldeo
J= [ (o7r stable 0,E lco)fE l o( l )dcl] f, (eo)d o
= P(ro stable 0, co)fo (co)dEo
This exposition is due to Vadim Marmer.
9That is, once the Eo have been drawn, and thus the u(S) are known for S E 7ro, the events
u(S') > u(S) and u(S") > u(S) are independent. This conditional independence allows conditional
probabilities to be expressed as products of the relevant independent events.
deviate to S'. The likelihood function used for optimization is thus
C(wO stable 0) = 1 E P(u (S')< max u(S) co,0)
Eo0 EoEEo S'EV SEperps,
1.2.2 Relaxed stability requirements
Now suppose that a less restrictive form was imposed on preferences:
u(S) = v(Xi, Xs; 0) + Eis
Here, the utility a player derives from a coalition can depend on interactions between
the player's characteristics and those of the coalition, and similar the E for a given
coalition can vary across players. In this case, the existence, but not uniqueness of
a stable partition can be guaranteed so long as some restrictions are placed on the
types of blocking coalitions that can form. In particular, only two types of potential
deviations will be considered when evaluating whether a given partition is stable:
refinements, where subcoalition of a single existing coalition breaks off to form a
coalition, and coarsenings, where two or more existing coalitions merger in order to
form a new coalition.
To solve this problem, Ray and Vohra [1997] only allow deviating coalitions to force
refinements of a partition, and Diamantoudi and Xue [2007] show that this creates
a stable set. Because hedonic games are simpler than the "equilibrium coalition
structures" that Ray and Vohra examine, refinements and coarsenings will be treated
identically. Otherwise, the theory follows that presented in Ray and Vohra. Let
-F /s 7r' and - \s 7r' mean that S unanimously prefers 7' to pi, where r' is a
coarsening and a refinement of 7, respectively. Using the terminology of Ray and
Vohra, 7r is blocked by -' if either there is a set of coalitions in -F that are unanimously
in favour of merging to create r', or there is a subset of "perpetrators" in 7r that are
unanimously in favour of deviating from their current coalition. In the former case 7r,
is the coarsening that results from the merger, while in the latter it is a refinement that
includes a coalition for these perpetrators and some arrangement of the "residual" left
behind when the perpetrators deviated, such that the configuration of perpetrators
and residual is stable. More formally, where -* should be read as "blocked by":
Definition 2. 7r - 7' if 3S such that either 7r Is ir' or i \s ir', where
1. 7 s r' if 7' \ 7r = S such that n -s r' and S = U Q for some Q C
2. i \s 7' if 3S E 7' such that ir -s ' and
a) 7r \ 7r' = S' with S' = U Q' for some Q' c r'
b) Q such that Q' - Q
The recursion is well defined since Q' is a proper subset of 7r'.
Theorem 2. Let -* be the transitive closure of -_.10 Then
1. If = {7rj~7' such that 7r - 7ir'} is a stable set with respect to (I, -*).
2. lI* is unique.
3. lI* contains a Pareto optimal partition.
Proof (existence). By construction, II* is internally stable. Now take some 7r F II*.
Then 3{rl,...., 7rr} C II such that 7r --+ -1 --+ --+ 71-m and either 7rm E I* or there
is a cycle with 7r = 7r for some 1 < m. If there is such a cycle, then it must contain
both mergers and dissolutions. Suppose that irk s 7Fk+1, and let Sj' C S be the set
of agents that strictly prefer 7rk+1 to 7rk. If Xk+l A 7Fk+2 then S2 D S+ since no agent
can be made worse off by a merger. If 7rk+1 \s' 7rk+2 then S2+ = (S+ \ R) U P where
R is some subset of the residual, and P -4 0 is some subset of the perpetrators, and
(R U P) C S'. Since S,_z+1 = 0, at some point the agents in S+ must be made worse
off. This can only happen via refinements, and only if there is a residual smaller than
S2. The latter, though, implies that some subset of S2 cannot be made worse off,
and thus S+ can never be empty. Thus a cycle cannot exist, and 7rm E I*. O
10To see why the transitive closure is used here, consider the case where rl js 72 \ s' 73.7r1 and
72 should not be in the stable set, while 7r3 should, but {7r3} is not a VNM stable set with respect
to -4 because 7r1 -- 7 3 .-
(uniqueness). Suppose that P** is also a stable set with respect to (H, -+). Consider
the bipartite directed graph defined by -+ with I** \ I* and P1* \ I** as the two sets
of nodes. Every node must have in-degree of at least one, but there can be no cycles.
The only such graph is empty, and thus I1** = I*. 11  E
(PO element). Let IlPO C I be the set of Pareto optimal partitions, and -- the
Pareto dominance operator. Suppose that II PO n I* = 0 and consider the directed
graph defined by -* U -- with IPO and H* as two sets of nodes. Ol
There is no particular reason, however, to believe that this particular partition
is more attractive as solution than the other partitions in H*. All partitions in I*,
including those that are not Pareto optimal, will be treated equally, since imposing
additional restrictions at this stage would mean that the solution set would no longer
be the outcome of the cooperative game coalition formation process described above. 12
Estimation of this model is similar to that of the restricted preferences model.
Following the notation in the restricted preferences section, let Eo denotes the vector
Eis, Vi E S, VS E ro. Suppose that partition ro is actually observed. If only partitions
in the solution set IP* are observed, and every partition in H* is assumed to be
selected with equal probability, then the parameters 0 can be estimated via maximum
likelihood."l The likelihood of w0 occurring is
(FO10) f I(ro stable 0, ) f
]E j I( stable 0, e) f,d7
- P(O G P1* 0) [1 f(E ro E I1*, 0)de
JE I(w stable 0, e) f, d
= P( Co E H* 0)EejIOen*,o [
where Z is the number of stable partitions, that is, III*|. Since the distribution
11This does not imply that IFI* I = 1.
12There may be some "solutions" that seem particularly unattractive: {rr IT* 13r' E *, --, x'}.
While the theory above could likely be rewritten to shrink the stable set, eliminating these elements,
it is unfortunately computationally infeasible to impose any restrictions that require enumerating
the entire stable set.
13 Thanks to Vadim Marmer and Francesco Trebbi for pointing out an error in an earlier version
of this section.
of E is known by assumption, this could in theory be calculated exactly, but due
to computational constraints, both terms in the above likelihood function will be
estimated. Assume that Fro in fact consists of 7r, 1, 70,2, ..., 70,K, the outcomes of K
independent coalition formation games. Then Z = ZIZ 2 ... ZK, and take the Kth
root of both sides of the above equation. Then
K (70 10) - E f * )E ( EnI [E]
is a consistent M-estimator for 0. However, for computational reasons it is not possible
to calculate the above, so instead a numerical approximation of the expectation will
be used. In particular, consider the case where K -+ oo. Then
log Z - IP~(ro,O N(0, o,)
and
EjrioEn*,o [Z ]  p El Z ,
Now let
Eiroen*,o[Z] = IIP7o,O
where p is the fraction of partitions that are stable.14 p will be estimated by randomly
selecting a set of partitions IA and calculating the probability that they are stable.
14Interchanging the expectation and reciprocal operations is valid because
E1 1
E[ ]= E[ i
-e -=K log Zi
= E[ei=K K]
= E[e-pK+o()]
= E[e-1K+o(VK)]
- E[e-tK]
since p > 1 because 7o E I1*.
This results in the estimator
K P(ro E 0*) l
K P(70 C l*10)IIIA
v fEnAP(wTi H I* 7To E I*, 0)
Since J1 does not depend on 0, an equivalent estimator is
K l* 0) IA
EIGnA P(7ri E lI* 17o E H*, 0)
The actual estimation is performed via numerical approximation of the above prob-
abilities. Specifically, if E 0 is a set of draws from the distribution of 0o, then the
approximation is
S1I HA1o (o P ( l|H0,co) n* , 0 C H*)
>EEO EHA P(ir H* 60,
Once again because of the convenient error partitioning of the above, the probability
can be expanded into a product of independent events. Let So be the set of all
coalitions that could be formed by mergers of the coalitions in ro, and let S 1 be the
set of all coalitions that are a subset of a coalition in 7ro. Then
P(wo 7 H*10, o)= JI P(wo As SO, o)
SE (SO USo)
Now approximate the denominator by defining cl and El in the same way as co and
Eo0 :
1
P(wjl E H , 0, wo E *) = EfJ P(7TI 7S O, O, , o E H*)IEi EEI SG(STuUS)
There are two problems with estimating this numerically. First, draws need to be
made from Ecl , co, wo E I*, and second, given a draw of ct from the correct distribu-
tion, the required probability needs to be calculated efficiently. Fortunately, in both
cases an application of Bayes' Rule is sufficient. To draw from ell , co, To G I*, first
define es to be the idiosyncratic shocks to coalition S e 7r. If S is not a potential
deviation from ro, then csl, ro,  E I* = cs since no additional information is pro-
vided by the fact that no is stable. If S is a potential deviation from wo, then consider
the identity
f(cs0, co) = f(cs0,E0, wo $ S)P(wo As S|O, co)+f(Es O, Eo,o -s S)P(o -<s S6, c0)
f(cs O, o6) is equal to the unconditional density f(cs), which is known by assumption.
The second distribution on the right hand side is a set of truncated distributions
because if 7o -<s S then it must be true that ui(S) > ui(wo), and thus
Ei > Ui(w0) - vi(S)
and these can be calculated sequentially. Thus, the desired distribution can be drawn
by simulating from
f (6so, 6o,o s S) f(Es o, 60) - f (Cs 0, C, wo -s S)P(7o -s S , 1o)
P(ro s SO, 6o)
which can be done sequentially for each member of S. From a computational per-
spective, it is important to avoid simulation "chatter", which would occur if a new e
were drawn for each new proposed 0, the simplest way of ensuring that w7o was always
in the stable set. Instead of simulating co directly, then, draw quantile indices qj, and
create ej from qj fresh for each iteration of 0.
The next problem is using these drawn et to calculate the probability
P( 1 7s S 1, co, e1, 0o E *)
where S' is some coalition not in 7t1. If S' is not a potential deviation from -o, then
the calculation is identical for those done for 7o, described above. However, if S'
is a potential deviation from 7o, then the fact that no is stable provides additional
information that needs to be taken into account. Consider
P(1 S' S'~6E0,  ) = P( 1 -S' s'10, 6O, , -F, o S')P(wo A, S' S1, 0, o,1)
+ P(7T 7As' S' 0, co, , o -s, S')P(ro -s, S'l0, Co, 1)
and since the left hand side can be calculated, and the second term of the right hand
side has the same set of truncated distributions described just above with respect to
the ct, then rearrangement once again permits calculation:
P( -s, S' , , El, io As,' S') -
1 - P(7 -<s S' 1, 6, El) - (1 - P(7i -s, S' O, E, 70 -<s, S'))P(o -< S'|, 0o,E 1)
1 - P(ro -<s, S'O6, co, EI)
Everything on the right hand side of this equation can be computed quickly, making
optimization feasible.
1.3 Application
Treating municipal mergers as a hedonic coalition formation problem is consistent
with anecdotal evidence concerning how mergers are effected. Negotiations regarding
compensation seem to be rare, even though controversy is common and the results
of unrest sometimes significant. Usually, some of the involved municipalities were in
favour of a merger while others were very much opposed, but those in favour did not
promise large transfers to those opposed in order to secure their cooperation. This
suggests that there is some problem with contractibility in political mergers such that
transfers are difficult or impossible, and thus, as in Acemoglu [2003], the "political
Coase theorem" does not hold. It thus seems more plausible to model mergers as
a coalition formation game without transfers. First, a simple model of public good
provisioning is presented, then some of the parameters are estimated from other
Japanese data sources. The data is described, and then the remaining parameters
are estimated via the methods presented in the preceding section.
1.3.1 Municipal Public Goods Model
Suppose that at time t, each municipality m provides a public good of level gmt to
its residents at a total cost of cm(gmt), with g including public goods such as local
roads, elementary education, waste disposal, and some health care. cm is assumed to
be subadditive in population: cm, < acm if the population of m' is a times as large as
that of municipality m. To pay for this service provision, the municipality levies taxes
at rate -int (possibly restricted by the national government to f), and receives transfers
Tnt from the national government such that the intertemporal budget constraint is
satisfied:
e-rtc m(gmt)dt = e-rt(TmtYm + Tmt)dt
where Ym is the tax base of the municipality, and r is the interest rate. If characteris-
tics of the municipality are constant across time, the discount rate is the same as the
interest rate, and there is no uncertainty, then the optimal tax rate and level of gov-
ernment services does not change across time, and everything is perfectly smoothed.
Thus, the t subscripts are dropped, and any short term transfers received (as in the
next section) are assumed to be perfectly smoothed out. Thus, the budget constraint
is treated as
Cm (gm) -= Y + r e-rtTmtdt
In addition to providing general services of level g9, the municipal council also has
control over some (costless) local policies, as in Alesina and Spolaore [1997]. Differ-
ent individuals have different ideal points regarding these policies, and thus as the
population of a municipality grows, so does the utility loss due to having to impose
a constant policies over the entire municipality. Thus, there is a tradeoff between
providing the public good cheaply, and having government policies that are carefully
tailored to residents' desires. A formal model of this tradeoff is not presented here,
but instead, controlling for the economies of scale in production of public goods,
higher population will enter the utility function negatively. 15
15The Alesina and Spolaore [1997] model can be extended to two dimensions in order to handle
actual geographic data, but the reduced form approach is used here because it is difficult to justify
any particular functional form assumption on the utility loss due to government policies being set
1.3.2 Japanese Local Public Finance
Mochida [2006] provides an excellent summary of the development and current state
of the Japanese local finance system. Post-war Japanese fiscal policy placed great
emphasis on the provision of equal quality public goods across the country, and es-
tablished a national standards for the general services that were provided by local
governments. To ensure that every municipality had sufficient funds to offer the
specified services at or above the standard quality level, the national government de-
veloped a complicated system of transfers, called the "Local Allocation Tax".16 The
transfer to municipality m is determined by the equation
Tm = max((g) - .75,Ym, 0) (1.1)
where g is the minimum quality of services the municipality is expected to provide,
dm(g) the estimated cost to the municipality of providing those services (referred
to as "Standard Financial Need" in official documents), T the fixed tax rate that
the municipality is required to charge. Ea varies significantly from municipality to
municipality, based on a formula developed by central ministries. The exposition of
this formula consists of approximately 280 pages of Japanese legal text; however, as
Figures 1-2 and 1-3 show, dm can be approximated quite well by the linear regression
cm(P) = 9(00 + 1POPm) + Vm (1.2)
These figures and equations effectively duplicate those found in an official Ministry
of Finance publications, as the linear approximation is well known and commonly
away from a resident's ideal point. Although multi-dimensional policy spaces in general suffer from
cycles, if preferences are Euclidean and the number of voters is large, then the plausible set of policies,
following a reasonable definition such as the yolk, lies within a small region. With an assumption
on how the policy is selected within that region, the remaining difficulty would be how preferences
of voters determine preferences over mergers. One possibility here would be to assume that voters
will move randomly within whatever merger they join, and thus do not apply their geography-based
policy preferences to decisions regarding which coalition to join.
16The slightly-confusing name is due to the fact that it is an allocation to local governments from
taxes collected by the national government.
used." The positive and significant intercept shown in Table 1.1 reflects the fact that
the central ministries believed that there were economies of scale in the production of
public goods, and thus per capita costs would be higher in municipalities with lower
population. At current exchange rates, g/3 is a little more than $10M. Thus, if the
national government estimated costs correctly, with a(g) _ c(g), the per capita cost
of providing g quality public goods in Ashiyasu village (population 567) is roughly
$22,000, compared with roughly $1,400 in Sakai city (population 790,000).
With almost half of Japanese municipalities having a population less than 10,000,
the decision to provide additional subsidies to smaller municipalities due to their size
was an expensive one. Although there were provisions for municipalities to merge,
there was little incentive for them to do so, because if a coalition S decided to form
a new (amalgamated) municipality, Ts would be calculated identically to Equation
1.1, above:
Ts = max(as() - .757Ys, 0) (1.3)
Thus almost all savings would be passed to the national government, and even a
slight preference for smaller population jurisdictions ensured that residents would be
opposed to mergers.18
During the financial difficulties of the early 1990s, the national government imple-
mented a series of reforms designed to reduce the total transfers provided to munici-
palities while minimizing the negative effects of this decrease. First, the government
substantially reduced transfers to the smallest municipalities by revising the Local
Allocation Tax. This can be approximated as
Tm = max(anw"(g) - .757Ym, 0)
new (-) = (/3ew + ! POPm) + vm
17 A new formula introduced after the period of interest is explicitly based on a linear function of
population and area.
IsIn general, the division of a municipality was prohibited. In one case, such a split did occur,
but both of the resulting municipalities were immediately merged with different neighbours.
as shown in Table 1.2, with 3gew being a little more than half the size of 3 .o 19 Second,
municipalities that merged between 1995 and 2005 would not have their transfers
lowered due to the merger for at least ten years starting from the date of the merger.
That is,
T new -Tnew
rnC rn
meS
would be provided for the decade following the merger. This resulted in a strong
financial incentive for municipalities to merge, as shown by the utility functions de-
rived in the appendix. By 2006 there were only 1821 municipalities remaining, down
from 3232 at the start of the merger period in 1995. Figure 1-4 shows the mergers
in Shizuoka Prefecture. Mergers were voluntary, and needed to be approved by the
municipal council of every participating municipality.20 The parameters to the utility
function can thus be estimated by examining the mergers that actually occurred.
1.3.3 Data
There were 3382 municipalities in 1995 at the start of the merger period, divided
into 47 prefectures (similar to US states). Since mergers do not cross prefectural
boundaries, each prefecture is treated as a separate game in the following sections.
Surface area data for each municipality is obtained from a 1996 survey conducted by
Geographical Survey Institute, an arm of the Japanese national government. Munic-
ipal population data comes from the 2000 national census as reported by the Home
Affairs Ministry. Taxable income per capita is used as a proxy for income per capita.
Taxable income data for 1996, as well as the list of mergers that actually occurred
come from the Asahi Shimbun minryoku. To construct the set of possible coalitions,
as described in more detail later, information on which municipalities share a border
is taken from Global Map files for Japan.
19Previously, mayors were responsible for delivering hundreds of "agency delegated functions" from
higher levels of government, making them bureaucrats as well as elected officials, and making it pos-
sible (at least in theory) for central ministries to fire a mayor for not performing a delegated function
according to specifications. "Agency delegated functions" were also abolished, and responsibility was
devolved in many cases to mayors and municipal councils.
201n about a third of cases, referenda were held. Nominally, these were consultative, but in general
the municipal council would not vote opposite to a referendum result
The data regarding municipal tax revenue, as well as the financial data used to
generate Table 1.1 is from the shichouson betsu kessan joukyou shirabe, which is an
official national government report of municipal finances. The 1996-1997 fiscal year
data is used as this is the first year available electronically. To determine the new
transfer policy, as shown in Table 1.2, the 2006-2007 fiscal year data is also used.
Because of the large transfers from the national treasury to local governments, this
data is handled quite carefully by officials in the central ministries and is generally
regarded as accurate, particularly the sections produced by the central government
itself. The isolated incidents of fraud reported generally relate to variables reported
by the municipalities, which are not used in this paper.
There are no missing values in any of the financial data or surface area data. In
the population data, approximately 6 values are missing because one merger took
place before the data was issued, and thus the old municipalities were not reported.
The 23 special wards covering the area of pre-war Tokyo city, although having powers
similar to municipalities, are excluded from the analysis because any enlargement of
this sui generis area would likely involve adding more wards, rather than changing
the borders of existing ones. The 12 "designated cities", which have some powers
normally reserved for prefectures, are omitted from the financial calculations because
their additional responsibilities increase their required spending, but they are included
in the rest of the analysis as regular cities. The categories of "core city" and "special
city" were created after the merger period, and thus do not directly affect the data.
Similarly, the policy distinctions between city (shi), town (chou), and village (son)
are ignored.Counties (gun) are statistical divisions, and have not had any political
function since the 1920s.
The initial laws implementing the new incentive scheme were passed in 1995,
and thus it would be optimal to use data from before this period. However, some
later data is currently used due to data availability issues. Almost all of the merger
negotiations and approvals occurred near the end of the 1996-2006 window, with most
occurring after 2002, and the latest data used is from 2000. In fact, the important
"Trinity" tax reforms were not even finalized until 2002, and this uncertainty provided
municipalities with a strong incentive to wait until the end of the period to conduct
any mergers. Thus, it seems that using financial data from 1996-1997 and population
data from 2000 should not be a huge concern. In particular, the financial data used is
calculations by the national government, not actual spending by municipalities, and
thus is not vulnerable to "last minute" capital spending seen in some environments. A
final issue is that, due to disorganization, coordination failure, or for political reasons,
a few mergers occurred after the end of the merger window. These "late" merging
municipalities did not benefit from the incentive scheme described above, and are not
considered in the estimation described below.
1.3.4 Estimation
Suppose that for any coalition S, the utility of municipality i in the coalition is given
by
ui(S) = 01 log ((1 - Ts)Yi) + 02 log10 s + 03 log POPs + 04 log AREAs + qXs + cis
where Xs are other fixed characteristics of the coalition. 21 The third term reflects the
value that residents place on smaller jurisdictions that can tailor government policies
more carefully to reflect local concerns, and the fourth term is included because
heterogeneity of policy ideal points may be greater when the same population is
spread out over a larger area. Income per capita and a dummy for whether the
coalition is actually a merger (i.e. non-singleton) being the only column in Xs. In
the future, however, additional interaction terms could be included. For estimation
via the restricted preferences method, the restriction Eis = cs = Es is required.
While de jure municipalities were given the power to set taxes as part of the
reforms, there is a belief that de facto they do not have much authority to change tax
rates, and there appear to have been very few significant shifts in tax rates. Thus,
2 1The existence of a representative agent is not obvious, since if many different potential merger
partners exist, and individuals are allowed to have arbitrary preferences, then Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem applies. If the only choice that needs to be made is which merger to pick, then "intermediate
preferences" would guarantee that the median voter is the representative agent. To have such a voter
exist, though, heterogeneity must be one dimensional and have a specific form [Grandmont, 1978].
estimation is performed assuming that local governments cannot change the tax rate,
which is fixed at T. This tax revenue, combined with transfers, then determines the
amount of general services provided.22
The determination of V, the set of potential mergers that need to be checked
during estimation, is slightly more problematic. There are a number of large mergers
observed, with the largest involving 15 municipalities. Almost all observed mergers
are geographically contiguous; however, even after restricting V to contiguous coali-
tions of size 15 or less, there are still over 1016 possibilities, which is computationally
infeasible.23 Many of these coalitions look very different than the actually observed
coalitions, however. In particular, they tend to be a thin line of municipalities, stretch-
ing almost all the way across a prefecture. The actually observed coalitions, on the
other hand, look like ellipses. Figure 1-5 shows a merger that actually occurred
(Hanamatsu city, in Shizuoka prefecture, involving 12 municipalities), while Figure
1-6 shows a typical randomly generated contiguous coalition of the same size. The
randomly generated coalition in this case suffers from a defect that is not considered
in the utility function given above: because of its elongated shape, travel time to a
single centrally-located city hall other such facility would be extremely high for resi-
dents starting in certain parts of the amalgamated municipality. Similarly, the cost of
visiting the more remote parts of the new municipality would likely be excessive for
centrally located municipal bureaucrats. These sorts of coalitions are thus ruled out
of consideration by the use of a restriction related to the surface area to perimeter
ratio of the coalition. Because the RAND-ESU [Wernicke, 2006] algorithm used to
generate the coalitions is limited in the types of restrictions it can accomodate, this
restriction is formulated in terms of graph theory characteristics, an approximation
22Since the transfers are phased out after ten years, the present value of this amount is used to
determine the effective transfer after smoothing.
23More specifically, there are approximately a dozen mergers that are not geographically contigu-
ous. Half of these involve municipalities on small islands amalgamating with a nearby municipality
separated by water, while the other half are mergers that would have been contiguous, had one
of the participants not dropped out late in the merger process. Although the law stated that the
mergers were to be geographically contiguous, these exceptions were allowed. No municipalities of
either type are generated as comparison coalitions, although the ones that did occur are retained in
the observed partitions.
which makes implementation computationally feasible.
The randomly generated potential coalition shown in Figure 1-6 differs from ac-
tually observed coalitions in that it borders over 30 other municipalities, whereas the
actually observed coalitions of this size never border more than 9. A restriction is
placed on the number of municipalities that the coalition can border is introduced,
with an upper bound based on the maximum in the actually observed mergers. This
restriction dramatically reduces the number of large coalitions that need to be consid-
ered: with 15-municipality coalitions, only 1 coalition in 10 billion has a small enough
number of neighbours. This reduces the total number of alternatives that need to be
considered to about 5 million, which is computationally feasible.
Another problem, only relevant to the estimation via relaxed stability require-
ments, is the estimation of the size of the stable set. Since the number of partitions
grows exponentially with the number of municipalities, it is not possible to examine
all partitions. The total number of partitions is unknown but bounded above by the
Bell numbers (Sloane #A000110), which are greater than 10100 for larger prefectures
such as Hokkaidou. Thus, instead, a random sample is drawn; however, it is not
trivial to randomly sample from a set which is too large to be enumerated. Thus,
random draws are obtained using Markov chains. Let the state space X be the set of
all partitions, and the transition matrix P be
Px, = k if y can be created by either breaking apart one coalition in x into
subcoalitions, or merging coalitions in x together to create one new coalition
Px, = 0 Vy = x that do not meet the above condition
Pxx = 1 - E Yx Px,
Since the state space is finite, this creates a valid transition matrix for sufficiently
small k. P describes a reversible Markov chain, since a transition from x to y via
merging implies a possible transition from y to x via a breakup, and vice versa. The
chain is connected, since any partition can be obtained by first breaking all coali-
tions down to singletons, and then constructing the desired partition. There is thus a
unique stationary distribution, since the chain satisfies the detailed balance condition
[Robert and Casella, 2004]. Moreover, the stationary distribution gives equal prob-
ability to each state, and thus draws from the stationary distribution are equivalent
to random draws from the set of all partitions. These draws can be performed using
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Unfortunately, the number of transitions that need to be considered is too large to
be computationally feasible. The number of ways a size 15 coalition could be broken
down into sub coalitions could be as high as a billion, and thus it is not practical to
enumerate all the possible transitions. Instead, the approach introduced by Wernicke
[2006] for the RAND-ESU algorithm will be used. Let p be a length 15 vector of "cut
probabilities" and let Q be a set of subcoalitions of S that form a partition of S. Then
enumerate a member of Q with probability -ij{ 1,..., s} pi. This gives each member of
Q an equal probability of being enumerated, but allows for a much smaller, randomly
selected set to be considered. So long as this randomly selected Q is re-randomized
each time a given state is reached, then the properties of the above Markov chain are
unchanged.
1.3.5 Results
The results are shown in Table 1.3. Results are consistent with the theory, with
high government services and low population being preferred, as predicted. Having
richer fellow residents also appears to be preferred, but the magnitude and statistical
significance of this effect depends on the method used. The dummy for mergers
is negative under both estimation methods, but statistically significant only in the
restricted preferences estimates, making it unclear whether there was indeed a strong
preference for the status quo. The ratio of the coefficients on government services
and population imply that a municipality would be willing to accept an increase
in population of one log point in exchange for an increase in the level of services
of either .06 or .12 log points. This implies that, the optimal population size for
a municipality is 75,000 or 150,000, respectively. This accords well with Japanese
estimates of the efficient size for a municipality. The Ministry of Internal Affairs'
"Standard Municipality" has a size of 100,000, and the Ministry's target of 1000
municipalities implies a target population (on average) of 125,000.24 Total spending
on municipal government services accounts for approximately 10% of income, so, if
the assumption of Cobb-Douglas utility is correct, and if the tax rate specified by the
national government is approximately the efficient level, then the implied willingness
to pay for small jurisdiction size is about 0.5% of income to cut municipal population
in half.
Although the sign on surface area is not as expected in the relaxed stability re-
quirements column, the magnitude is tiny. The smaller standard deviation of the
error term in the relaxed stability requirements estimates is an indication that the
variables included in the estimation are relatively more important in determining
choices. Additional data that could be used in the future includes commuting pat-
terns, age and education distribution, and possibly industrial sectors. In some cases
it might be possible to also replace means with medians, since the variance (but not
the precise distribution) of income is known for each municipality. Finally, prefecture
fixed effects could be considered, although this presents some computational issues.
1.4 Counterfactual simulations
A major advantage of having coefficient estimates for a structural model is the ability
to conduct counterfactual analysis. Here, two alternative national government policies
will be examined: first, an incentive scheme for richer municipalities that participate
in mergers; second, national government enforcement of transfers negotiated between
municipalities during the coalition formation process.
1.4.1 Transferable utility
Suppose that the central government offered to enforce whatever transfers resulted
from decentralized negotiations amongst municipalities. That is, if municipality m
promised to make a certain transfer from its current residents to the current residents
24 Hayashi [2002] finds that the smallest city of efficient scale has a population of 120,000. This es-
timate is particularly interesting, since Hayashi uses third-party ratings of municipal service quality,
which is not used in this paper.
of municipality n, the central government would ensure that this was actually carried
out. Assume that the transfers negotiated are "small", in the sense that a linear
approximation of utility around transfers of zero is reasonable:
Zjes zij
u (S, z) = eOlog((1 - Ts)Yi + P-- ) + ... +  isPOPi
olog((1 - Ts)Yi) + 1 s + ... +(1 -Ts)y. - POPi
Where E z is total transfers received from other municipalities. Now define
(1 - rs)yiPOP
i (S, Z) =- 01 "Ui(S)
E Zz ij + Ollog((1 - Ts)yi) + ... + cis
jES
and thus fi approximates a standard transferable utility cooperative game. This does
not have a unique solution, but is covered by the Ray and Vohra [1997] approach
detailed above, and so will result in some sort of stable set. If random 6 are drawn,
then some idea of the efficiency gain of enforcing the TU game, versus simply admin-
istering a fixed incentive structure, can be obtained. The exact transfers, however,
depend on which stable coalition structure forms and exactly how the surplus from
each coalition is divided. For a given coalition S, the possible utilities of the munici-
palities are determined by the possible values of x, where the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. ZiEs Xi = V(S)
2. EiS' x > V(S') VS' c S
where V(S) = Es ii(S) is the value of coalition S.
It seems extremely unlikely that poor municipalities would have more bargaining
power than rich municipalities, and thus an "equitable" distribution of the surplus
seems to be the most optimistic scenario. A more pessimistic scenario would give
most of the bargaining power to richer municipalities, with a resulting increase in
post-merger inequality.
The nucleolus is used as a "best case" equitable division. It is the allocation which
maximizes over all potential deviating coalitions S' the smallest difference between
the amount allocated to the members of S' and that which they could obtain if they
deviated. More specifically, x is determined by
argmin max E(S')
x S'CS
where E(S') is the excess of coalition S':
E(S') = V(S') - xi
iES'
note that if S is part of a stable partition, E(S') < 0 VS' C S. There may be more
than one x that leads to the same maximum above, but by continuing to minimize
excesses lexicographically, a unique value of x is obtained. This is the nucleolus. To
estimate the utility obtained in this case, 100 separate draws of E were performed,
and the resulting nucleoli were averaged. This was compared to the no-transfer case,
using the same 100 draws of E. The results are shown graphically in Figure 1-7.
Poorer municipalities are worse off, relative to the no-transfers case, while richer
municipalities are much better off. Thus, making transfers feasible may or may not
be optimal for the national government, depending on its social welfare function. A
worst-case scenario was also examined, where richer municipalities are assumed to
have all of the bargaining power, and thus as much surplus as possible is transferred
to the richest municipality, and then the next richest. The results are very similar to
those shown in Figure 1-7, although the regressive nature of the transfers is slightly
more pronounced.
1.4.2 Incentives to merge
Suppose that the national government offered an additional, budget balanced incen-
tive for certain municipalities to merge. The targeted municipalities should be those
that are most likely to be opposed to mergers that would benefit other municipalities,
and the most likely municipalities to fall into that category are richer municipalities.
Consider the policy that offered a transfer equivalent to 0.3% of income, to residents
of richer municipalities that participated in a merger, where a "richer" municipality
is defined as one that had above average income per capita in more than half of the
potential mergers they could have participated in. This transfer would be paid for
by an increase in the income tax on everyone. This type of subsidy preserves the
existence of a unique stable partition, since it is equivalent to increasing um for rich
municipalities while at the same time decreasing u(S) for those singleton coalitions
that consist of a single rich municipality.
There are two different types of questions that could be asked regarding the effect
of this policy. One is whether, conditional on the observed outcome occurring, the
counterfactual policy would have yielded a better outcome. The other is whether the
counterfactual policy would have yielded a better outcome without any information
about what outcome occurs under the actually implemented policy. The difference
concerns the way the e are drawn. Both of these will be considered, and the results
obtained via the two methods are similar.
First, consider the case where 7ro is the actually observed partition. Given that
the observed outcome occurred under the actually implemented policy, and assuming
that the true 0 are exactly the estimated 0, the distribution of e is no longer i.i.d.;
however, draws can be made from {elro stable, 0} via Gibbs sampling. Then, for
each of these draws of E, the stable partition under the counterfactual policy can
be computed via the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 1. The changes in
utility, averaged over several simulations, are shown in Figures 1-8 and 1-9. In one
representative simulation, out of 3822 municipalities, 784 received the new incentive
transfer but also merged under the original policy, and there were 176 municipalities
that participated in mergers that did not occur under the original policy. The mean
change in utility is equivalent to an increase in income of 0.3%.25 However, even
though almost all quantiles of the utility distribution are shifted upwards, the new
policy is not rank preserving, and a significant number of municipalities would be
25The fact that this is the same as the size of the additional transfer offered is purely coincidental.
better off under the actual policy. In each of the simulations, there were a few
dozen municipalites that were in mergers under the actual policy, but whose merger
partners abandoned them for another coalition under the alternative policy. Thus,
not all municipalities would be in favour of switching to the alternative policy.
Next, consider the case where the parameters are known, but not the C. Here, the
question is what the difference in the expected utility of municipalities is between the
actual and alternative policies. To determine this, the e are drawn randomly, and
then stable partitions are generated under both policies.2 6 The difference between
the actual and alternative policies are shown in Figure 1-10.
If transfers between players are impossible, but there is a social planner that can
provide incentives for coalition formation, then at least in the two player case, the
social planner should offer such incentives:
Example 3. In the setup described in Example 1, if el and C2 are random variables
with density f, then before the e are known, ~7, 6 > 0 such that both players would be
in favour of a social planner offering an incentive 6 for coalition formation:
fi ({1}) = ui({1}) - T
fii({1, 2}) = i({1}) + cE +
E[l(il({1, 2}) > fl({1})) - 1(ii2({1,2}) > i2({2 )) -6] =7
Ex ante, both players are in favour of this incentive being offered because
E[uj] = E[uj({i})]
+ E[1(ul({1, 2}) > u({1})) - l(u2({1, 2}) > u2({2})) - (ui({1, 2}) - ui({i}))]
26 These partitions are produced by generating random coarsenings of an all-singleton partition
and then drawing from this set of partitions after all the duplicates have been removed. This is
a consistent method of drawing a sample of stable partitions with uniform selection probability,
although it is biased (i.e. the probability of selection is not uniform) when the random coarsenings
drawn do not enumerate all the stable partitions. The degree of bias depends on the number
of random coarsenings drawn, but this bias does not appear to be important, since changing the
number of random coarsenings generated does not change the results.
and thus
SE[u =o = f (O)(E[max(u( {1, 2}), ui({i}))] - ui({i})) > 0
Intuitively, the gains from the incentive are first order, occurring whenever one
player is almost indifferent between forming the {1,2} coalition or not, and the other
player is very much in favour. The losses, on the other hand, are second order: when
both players are almost indifferent, the incentive results in a (1,2} coalition now
forming when it wouldn't have previously. Although it is difficult to show analytically,
this result appears to hold in the more complicated coalition formation game examined
below, where there are many players and many potential coalitions. In a larger
game, however, any proof must take into account that a new coalition able to form
only because of the incentive might displace an existing non-singleton coalition, thus
changing the set of stable coalition structures. This is an additional cost of offering the
incentive, and thus any general theorem regarding the efficiency of offering incentives
to form (non-singleton) coalitions would have to have restrictions to ensure that the
cost of such a disruption of existing coalitions is not too high. Thus, although this
result is likely the reason for the increase in utility observed when additional incentives
for mergers are provided, no formal proof is offered.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper estimated the parameters determining preferences in a cooperative form
political coalition formation game, using two different sets of assumptions and def-
initions of the solution set. The results are consistent with intuition, and are used
to examine potential alternative national government policies. Counterfactual sim-
ulations suggest that an alternative incentive scheme that rewarded relatively rich
municipalities for merging would have resulted in welfare improvements under most
reasonable social welfare functions. Allowing transfers to be negotiated between mu-
nicipalities may or may not be superior, depending on the national government's
aversion to inequality and the bargaining power of the various municipalities. The
latter is likely unknown to the national government, and thus even if transfers between
municipalities could be enforced, it may not be beneficial for the national government
to do so. Of course, further work could consider other alternative national govern-
ment policies. 27 Additional covariates could also be added to the model.2 8 At least
as important as the implications to government policy, however, is the methodology
developed. A coalition formation game without transfers accurately describes many
real-world phenomena, but it is rarely estimated in the empirical literature. As the
price of computing power decreases, however, the number of uses of this sort of model
that are feasible should increase. Although the game presented in this paper could be
estimated only because the geographical nature of the data permitted a large num-
ber of possible coalitions to be discarded, in the future such restrictions should be
less necessary. The results given above, then, are hopefully only the first of many
applications of coalition formation models of this type to actual data.
27 For example, one possibility that was not considered in this paper is that of a tax on negotiated
transfers. In the simplest price control model, a tax redistributed to the consumer should be able
to mimic a price control, but with the assurance that the consumers with the highest willingness
to pay obtain the good. To the extent that the inability to make transfers is like a price control at
zero, then, it could be that the optimal policy for the government - rather than specifying a fixed
incentive scheme to encourage rich municipalities to merge with their neighbours - would be to allow
transfers, but tax them heavily and redistribute the revenue obtained to the poorest municipalities.
Overall, the problem bears some resemblance to the classic rent control problem.
2 8 0ne potential incentive for mergers that is not considered in this paper is the gappei tokurei
sai, special bond issues allowed for municipalities planning amalgamation. Currently, the estimation
strategy assumes that these bonds, subsidized by the national government, exactly eliminate any
direct financial cost of merging, such as the construction of a new city hall. This follows the official
government position; however, many believe that these merger bonds allowed significant capital
expenditures beyond the actual costs of amalgamation. Another potential incentive would be the
additional powers gained by a municipality that is classified as a "special city" or "core city", both
of which have cutoffs based on municipal population. Finally, the grouping of municipalities into
counties dates back to the Meiji restoration, by some accounts county lines are reflected in the patern
of mergers observed.
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Table 1.1: Dependent variable is c(gs), cost of providing general services ('96-'97 fiscal year)
I
1294.6
(23.0)
136.4
(0.3)
(Intercept)
POPULATION
AREA
INCOME.INEQ
INCOME
IS.CITY
POP*INCOME.INEQ
POP*INCOME
POP*IS.CITY
PREFECTURE
N
II
808.4
(24.4)
136.0
(0.3)
4.3
(0.1)
0.4
(4.8)
-1070.4
(69.0)
324.1
(54.9)
3216
III
834.3
(25.2)
136.6
(0.3)
3.6
(0.1)
0.3
(4.9)
-779.8
(104.3)
369.8
(54.2)
X
3216
Units: Y1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of residents, AREA is in square kilometers,
INCOME is in Y1,000,000 per capita per year, INCOME.INEQ is the coefficient of variation of income, IS.CITY is a dummy
variable coded as 1 if the municipality in question is a city, and zero if it is a village or town. PREFECTURE is a set of dummy
variables for each of the 47 prefectures, with the restriction that the sum of the coefficients on these variables must equal zero.
Designated cities and special wards are excluded from the regression because they have additional responsibilities devolved from
the prefectural governments, and thus have higher (and non-comprable) expenditures per capita.
----
IV
792.2
(27.1)
142.3
(1.7)
3.8
(0.1)
- 20.9
(4.3)
-164.9
(69.1)
- 16.2
(59.2)
1.1
(0.1)
- 30.5
(1.0)
5.4
(2.2)
3216
V
902.7
(21.2)
142.5
(1.3)
2.9
(0.1)
- 12.4
(3.3)
-483.4
(79.8)
295.4
(48.1)
0.2
(0.1)
- 8.6
(1.5)
- 1.7
(1.7)
X
32163220
Table 1.2: Dependent variable is c(gs), cost of providing general services
fiscal year
'96-'97 '06-'07
(Intercept) 899.9 582.2
(43.9) (59.5)
POPULATION 129.4 131.5
(0.5) (0.6)
AREA 4.6 4.6
(0.2) (0.2)
N 1194 1194
Units: Y1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of
residents, AREA is in square kilometers, designated cities and special wards are
excluded as in Table 1.1. The sample is further restricted to those municipalities that
did not participate in a merger in order to have the same sample in both periods.
Thus, the change in coefficients represents a change in national government transfer
policy on the same group of municipalities during the period in question. Inflation
during this period was negligible.
Dependent variable is ui(S), utility to municipality i from merger S
log(gs)
log(POPULATIONs)
log(AREAs)
log(INCOMEs)
IS.MERGERs
a7
restricted
preferences
1.00
(0.05)
-0.06
(0.01)
-0.13
(0.01)
0.05
(0.03)
-0.18
(0.01)
0.35
relaxed stability
requirements
1.00
(0.001)
- 0.12
(0.0004)
0.01
(0.0004)
1.58
(0.001)
- 0.001
(0.001)
0.05
The coefficient on government services (gs) is normalized to 1, with the standard
deviation a of the error term (Es and eis, respectively) determined by this normaliza-
tion. INCOME is income per capita. IS.MERGER is a dummy variable equal to 0 if
the coalition S is a singleton (and thus would not imply a merger) and 1 otherwise.
The standard errors presented in the second column assume that the error introduced
by numerically estimating the size of the solution set is not important.
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Figure 1-2:
"Standard Financial Need" of Japanese Municipalities
('96-'97 fiscal year)
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"Standard Financial Need"
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Figure 1-5: Hanamatsu City in Red
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This connected graph represents Shizuoka Prefecture (also shown in Figure 1-4).
"Old" Hanamatsu City is 22202.
Figure 1-6: Random Contiguous Coalition in Red
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Figure 1-7:
Utility change from allowing transfers
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The slope is statistically significant (t=4), although this is not taking into account
that the data is generated from a simulation and the simulation itself is based on
estimated coefficients.
Figure 1-8:
Effect of Alternative Policy by Quantile
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Figure 1-9:
Effect of Alternative Policy by Quantile (Population Weighted)
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Figure 1-10:
Utility change from incentive scheme
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Chapter 2
Why Do We Have the Countries
We Have?
2.1 Introduction
In the early twentieth century, the settler colonies of the British Empire were clearly
moving towards independence. Within a few years of the 1907 Colonial Conference
in London, "Dominion" status had been granted to five colonies: Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Newfoundland, and South Africa. In 1931, the Statute of Westmin-
ster provided the mechanism for de jure independence; however, only four of the five
Dominions eventually made use of it. Newfoundland, a large island on the eastern
coast of North America, opted instead to join Canada as its tenth province. This
decision was due in large part to an extremely onerous $97 million debt, built up over
time due to corruption, financial mismanagement, and poor economic performance.'
Had Newfoundland been better governed and more economically successful during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, today it might well be an independent
country. This paper shows that small colonies were more likely to become indepen-
dent if they were economically successful, resulting in selection-induced correlations in
the set of countries that are actually observed today. Since cross-country regressions
are the only type of empirical evidence available to test some theories, and have been
1See modern surveys such as Porter [2004] and See [2001] for the current consensus on this issue.
used extensively for a long period, it is important to understand which observations
are actually in the cross-country dataset, and why. Moreover, although decoloniza-
tion is mostly complete, the estimated model does not contain elements specific to
colonialism, and thus may be applicable to current independence movements, as well
as areas that never experienced European colonialism.
The impact of selection bias on the estimated relationship between size and growth
rates has been discussed extensively in other contexts. For example, there is a consid-
erable literature on the size and growth of firms, starting with the assertion by Gibrat
1931 that the growth rate distribution was the same across different size firms. This
has been contested by a variety of subsequent authors, as described by Sutton [1997].
Mansfield [1962] and Evans [1987] were among the first to note that since exit prob-
ability is decreasing in firm size, then if firms that have exited are not observed there
will be a tendency to see higher growth rates among the smaller firms that are ob-
served. The argument presented below has this same general feature, with smaller
colonies more likely to disappear. A difference, though, is that colonies are presumed
to have persistent differences in per capita output, and thus the disappearance of
some small jurisdictions will still result in biased estimates many years later.
This paper presents a model that builds on recent theoretical work regarding the
optimal size of independent countries, in particular Alesina and Spolaore [1997]. A
fixed cost of running a country provides an incentive for smaller colonies to join a
neighbour in order to enjoy efficiencies of scale, while disutility from having national
policy far away from residents' ideal points provides an incentive for colonies to be-
come independent countries individually. If the loss from the distance between a
resident's policy ideal point and the national policy is proportional to production,
then colonies with larger population, higher per capita income, and greater distance
from other countries should be less likely to be annexed to another colony during the
decolonization process. An immediate prediction of this model is that the smaller
countries that are actually observed should have higher per capita income. Thus, the
model provides an explanation for why it has been so difficult to find scale effects in
cross-country data.
A second prediction of the model is that this selection should be more severe when
the colony in question is near countries or other colonies that would be interested in
absorbing it. This suggests that geographic distance to other countries may not be an
excludable instrument for cross-country regressions involving economic performance,
thus implying that models that make use these variables, such as the gravity model of
trade (recently discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop [2003]) may also give biased
coefficient estimates. Frankel and Romer [1999] use gravity as an instrument to show
that trade has a significant positive effect on economic performance. If there is more
selection when there are many close by neighbours, though, then the Frankel and
Romer result may be due to this selection effect rather than any causal relationship
between trade and economic growth.
Empirical tests of these predictions are performed using a dataset of colonies of Eu-
ropean powers drawn principally from official statistics. A major difficulty in studying
the determinants of national boundaries is normally obtaining an appropriate sample:
there are an infinite number of ways of partitioning the world, yet most types of data
are only available for a small number of these. Moreover, datasets are often created
with the current political boundaries determining the units of observation, so the
amount of data available for political arrangements that did not come to pass is even
more limited. However, the majority of non-European political boundaries date to
the colonial period, as decolonization normally occurred along existing borders. Since
countries that emerged from this process tended to consist of one or more colonies,
colonial-period data can be used to look for correlates of independence.2 There does
not appear to be any previous empirical work in economics that studies determinants
of national independence directly.
Ideally, the characteristics that caused the original colonial borders to be set where
they were could also be examined; however, there is almost no data available for the
pre-colonial period, and so it is difficult to analyse this early stage of jurisdiction
formation. Instead, the analysis presented will take the colonial borders in 1950 as
2 The fragmentation of large colonies, such as British India or French West Africa is an extremely
interesting topic that will not be directly addressed in this paper. The Alesina and Spolaore [1997]
argument regarding heterogeneity and returns to scale may be applicable in this case as well.
the initial state, and examine only changes in borders that occurred after that date. A
problem with this approach is that some very small, very poor colonies may already
have disappeared by 1950 through annexation to adjacent jurisdictions, and thus
will not show up in the dataset at all. For example, Labuan, a small island off the
coast of Borneo, was made a British crown colony in 1848. Its rich natural resources
(especially coal) and a location close to a major trade route were supposed to lead to
an economic boom, but corruption and general mismanagement led to it becoming
a dismal failure instead.3 In 1867 Labuan was added to the Straits Settlements,
and in 1890 it was annexed to North Borneo, where it remains today as a part of
Malaysia. To the extent that there were many rapid failures such as Labuan, the
sample available in the 1950s is in fact already a selected sample, with the majority
of the extremely small and poor locations removed. This implies that the estimated
magnitude of the selection bias is likely lower than the actual magnitude of the bias.
Analysis of this set of European colonies yields empirical support for the theory
presented: large colonies almost always became independent, while smaller ones be-
came independent only if they were relatively affluent or were too remote to join
another colony or country.4 As predicted by the model, then, if economic outcomes
in the colonial period are persistent, then in the observed set of countries small coun-
tries should have better economic performance, and this correlation is shown to exist
in current GDP data, both in terms of levels and growth rates. The selection ef-
fect is particularly strong for countries that had the possibility of joining a nearby
neighbour, and the Frankel and Romer [1999] instruments for trade are shown to
be biased upwards. The coefficient on the gravity instrument used by Frankel and
Romer is positive and statistically significant when the only observations used are
those colonies that become independent, but that the coefficient becomes negative
and statistically insignificant when all colonies - including those that were annexed
- are included in the regression.
3 See Pope-Hennessy [1964] for a colourful account of this episode from the point of view of the
local governor.
4 The fact that smaller colonies were less likely to become independent has been noticed outside
of the economics literature [Christopher, 2002], but the implications of this result appear not to have
been explored.
Section 2.2 presents the model of annexation and independence of colonies, and
Section 2.3 discusses the data used in regressions. Section 2.4 tests the model using
colonial data, and discusses how the results explain why scale effects are not observed
in cross-country regressions, and how instruments such as those used in Frankel and
Romer [1999] may give biased results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theory
Following Alesina and Spolaore [1997], the world consists of a population distributed
on the [0, 1] interval with density f. The interval is partitioned into political ju-
risdictions, where jurisdiction s can be described by a single interval [se, sh]. 5 The
population at location x produces y(x) per capita.6 Each political jurisdiction is run
by a ruler, and the payoff to the ruler given below may either be regarded as the
personal gains of a self-interested despot, or the aggregate welfare of residents under
a benevolent autocrat. Let a partition 7 of the world be a set of jurisdictions such
that every point on [0,1] is in exactly one jurisdiction.' Let iro be the initial partition
of the world, that is, the partition at time t = 0. The rulers are the players in a
finite-horizon game that lasts T periods.8 In the last period, ruler i chooses a policy
xi, and then receives a payoff of
S
h
-= -K + j (T- Ix - xl) f (x)y(x)dx - Ci
SAlthough Bogomolnaia et al. [2008] demonstrate that it is possible for there to be non-consecutive
jurisdictions if the population is considered as discrete individuals, the following follows Alesina and
Spolaore in considering only the case with consecutive jurisdictions. This is plausible given that
almost all actually observed countries have this property.
6 Here it is not very important whether the higher per capita production is because of resources
such as oil, or whether it is because of better political institutions. Different sources of high pro-
ductivity, however, may lead to different dynamics for population growth. Countries with fixed
endowments of natural resources may not see as sharp increases in population as those whose higher
GDP per capita is based on institutions that can easily accommodate additional labour.
7Alternatively, if all jurisdictions are closed intervals, then the restriction should be that all but
a finite number of points are in exactly one jurisdiction.
SThis is inspired by the Hyndman and Ray [2007] model, but features a finite number of periods
and several other simplifications.
if the ruler is in charge of a jurisdiction running from s to sh in period T, and
Ui = - Ci
if the ruler is not in charge of any jurisdiction in period T. Here K is the fixed cost of
running the administration of a country, 7 is a constant and exogenous tax rate, I I II
is distance, and C is other costs incurred. The simplest interpretation of the policy
variable would be the physical location of the capital, but there are also other possible
interpretations using heterogeneous preferences for national policies. In the simplest
case, the distance term can be seen as representing either the decreased effectiveness
of tax collection further away from the capital, or the increased cost of administering
populations in far away locations.
Having only a fixed cost for the administration of a jurisdiction of any size leads
to the result that, at least until the loss from distance reaches T, rulers are always
interested in acquiring more territory. This matches the observation that as a gen-
eral rule, many countries appear determined to acquire additional territory, while
relatively few have tried unsuccessfully to divest themselves of troublesome regions. 9
In each period before T, a proposer i is deterministically selected from among all
the rulers according to some protocol. The proposer can either do nothing, or can
make a proposal of strength c > 0 to some target j who is currently the ruler of a
jurisdiction. The simplest interpretation of a proposal is that it is a military invasion.
The target has the choice of either paying c (interpreted as fighting back the invaders),
or losing control of his jurisdiction. The proposer incurs a cost of c regardless of the
outcome, the target only if the choice is made to keep control of the jurisdiction. Play
then proceeds to the next period. The partition 7t+1 is identical to 7rt if the target at
time t payed (that is, defended their territory) or if no proposal was made at time t;
otherwise, 7rt+ is a coarsening of 7rt, where the target's jurisdiction has been merged
into the proposer's jurisdiction. A strategy ai for ruler i, then, identifies for each
9 An interesting exception is the Falkland Islands before the war between Argentina and the United
Kingdom. The British government had put effort into moving the islands towards Argentinian control
prior to the war, due to the expense of supporting the dependency.
node in the game tree, the action that i would take if selected as proposer, as well as
the highest strength proposal to which i would respond by paying if i were the target
of a proposal. The solution concept for the game is subgame perfect equilibrium,
and such an equilibrium exists and can be identified via backward induction because
the infinite action proposal-response structure involves only two players Hellwig et al.
[1990].10 The remainder of the analysis uses the fact that 7r* is unique, even if the
exact strategies played are not known.
In particular, this game can be used to predict what characteristics the equilib-
rium outcome should have when the initial characteristics of the world are modified
in certain ways. Below, theoretical predictions are given regarding how changes in
population density, per capita production, and distance should be reflected in the
equilibrium outcome. These predictions form the basis for the remainder of the pa-
per, and will be tested empirically in the following sections. Let 7r* be the equilibrium
outcome under the original specification, and i* the outcome under the modified spec-
ification. First, consider modifications that should not result in a jurisdiction being
annexed in the new equilibrium outcome if it were not annexed in the old equilibrium
outcome:
Proposition 1. If s is a jurisdiction in 7ro and also in w*, then
1. if a modified game is constructed with a new population density, f, such that
f = f except within the jurisdiction s where f = af with a > 1, then s must
also be in f*.
2. if a modified game is constructed with per capita production y, such that y = y
except within the jurisdiction s where = ay with a > 1, then s must also be
in #*.
3. if a modified game is constructed on the interval [0, 1 + 26] by inserting an
unpopulated space of length 6 on either side of s, then s must also be in #i*.11
10Since the rulers can choose their policy arbitrarily, there is no reason why rulers in larger
jurisdictions would absorb smaller ones, rather than a tiny jurisdiction taking over a much larger
neighbouring one. A more complicated model with costs to choosing certain policies could ensure
that takeovers happened in the more plausible direction.
1 1Whether this space is added inside or outside the boundaries of s is not important.
Next, consider modifications that should not result in a jurisdiction that was
previously annexed to now remain independent:
Proof. 1. Because a ruler in control of s and nothing else chooses the policy that
maximizes payoffs from s, and only the payoffs related to s have been increased,
thus the payoff to controlling only s must have increased faster than any other
payoff, since all the mergers will generically have a different optimal policy.
Thus if it was optimal to remain in control of s alone before, it must still be
optimal in the modified game.
2. Identical to the above. In this case, the critical point is that the loss due to
distance is a fraction of production, and thus the total loss is increasing as
production increases.
3. Suppose that s is not a jurisdiction in i*. Since the possible partitions have not
changed, the game tree is the same, and the only payoffs that have changed are
the ones involving s merging with some other jurisdiction, and all of these have
decreased due to the increased distance. The payoff to s by itself is unchanged.
Thus if s merged in the modified game, it should also have merged in the original
game.
Proposition 2. If s is a jurisdiction in 7ro but not in -r*, then
1. if a modified game is constructed with a new population density, f, such that
f = f except within the jurisdiction s where f = af with a < 1, then s must
also not be in r*.
2. if a modified game is constructed with per capita production y, such that y = y
except within the jurisdiction s where y = ay with a < 1, then s must also not
be in ir*.
Proof. Independence is a fixed cost, but the loss due to distance is proportional to
production, and thus a decrease in population or per capita production could not
create an incentive to remain independent. In particular, note that the policy choice
in an independent s must create less disutility in s than the policy choice in any other
merged jurisdiction containing s, because the policy choice is selected optimally in
every case. Thus as s becomes less productive the benefits of independence relative
to a merger must decrease in absolute terms. O[
Thus, the model predicts that under otherwise identical conditions, jurisdictions
that are further away, larger, and richer will tend to remain independent, while those
that are small and poor will tend to be amalgamated into other jurisdictions.12 That
is, a jurisdiction may remain independent if it is either far away or rich, and thus there
is a selection effect, where jurisdictions that are neither far away nor rich disappear
via amalgamation. 13 Finally, if additional empty space is added at the edges of
the boundary of a jurisdiction, this should make the jurisdiction less attractive for
mergers. A jurisdiction with a desert on one side and an ocean on the other, for
example, may be an unattractive target. Thus, jurisdictions with higher surface
area may be more likely to become independent. These predictions can be tested
empirically with data from decolonization in the 20th century.
2.3 Data
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Span-
ish colonies in 1950.14 In almost all cases, data is taken from official colonial sources. 15
The initial political boundaries used are those described by the colonizing powers.
12A simple specification of what it means to become "closer" in this model is difficult, unless there
is assumed to be an area of zero population around the jurisdiction in question.
13One of the critical assumptions here, though, is that even in the case of resource extraction there
are losses that are increasing in distance. This seems plausible, given the difficulties that countries
such as Nigeria and Bolivia have faced in exploiting resources that are located in regions distant
from the capital.
14A number of colonies became independent before 1950, and are thus not in the same. Most
of these colonies, however, were neo-Europes, where physical distance is a very poor predictor of
heterogeneity and thus differences in policy ideal points. Furthermore, while it may be plausible to
annexations in certain parts of the world as the result of decisions by dictators, it is less clear that
this is appropriate in the case of Canada or Australia. While the collapse of the Spanish Empire in
the early 1800s is very interesting, the required data is difficult to find, and it is unclear what the
colonial jurisdictions should be used as a base line.
'
5Data sources:
Thus, Algeria is not included in the dataset, because it was considered an integral
part of France. Similarly, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are excluded because they
were reported as SSRs by official Soviet sources. This stance is not taken merely
because of data availability issues: if Algeria and Latvia were included in the dataset,
then there is no reason why Scotland or Alberta should not be, or for that matter
any region of any country. The implied number of observations in the universe would
thus be extraordinarily large, and it is not clear how to take a random sample of these
possibilities. 16
Unfortunately, there are very few estimates of y for those colonies which did
not actually become countries. Government revenue per capita, however, is likely
positively correlated with output per capita, and revenue per capita data is available
for the whole set of colonies. Figure 2-1 shows that the relationship between revenue
per capita and GDP is fairly strong, even when using GDP statistics from 2000. f
is readily available from colonial data sources. The policies enacted in each resulting
country are difficult to measure, but it is not necessary to test this portion of the
theory. Once again following Alesina and Spolaore [1997], suppose that there is
an equivalence between physical distance and distance in policy bliss points for the
population.
For population, data is taken from the colonial census closest to 1950. No correc-
tions have been made for population growth between different census years, as most
colonies have a census within a few years of 1950. Surface area is taken from colonial
France Annuaire Statistique Des Territoires D'outre-Mer
Great Britain Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories
Netherlands Statistisch Jaarboek Nederlandse Antillen
Jaarcijfers Voor Suriname
Handbook on Netherlands New Guinea
Portugal Anudrio Estatistico
Spain Anuario Estadistico De Espaia
The main statistical yearbook series does not appear to include any colonial information, which
may be related to the lack of formal structure for Dutch colonialism. New Guinea appears not to
have issued statistical yearbooks, but the source used is an official government publication.
16In the case of France, Algeria consisted of three of the 90 French departements, so there is no
reason that any other set of departements could not have become independent. The partition of
India is not examined in this paper, but there the Radcliffe line was drawn effectively from scratch,
implying that there were an infinite number of ways that Pakistan could have been separated from
the Indian Union.
documents if possible, and estimated from modern sources otherwise. There are only
minor discrepancies between surface area reported by colonial authorities c. 1950 and
modern estimates. Revenue is always from official colonial sources, with conversion
from local currencies done at documented unofficial rates. The year closest to 1950
for which data was available was used. If financial data for the same year was not
available for all colonies within a given empire, appropriate corrections were made.
No adjustments were made across empires.
The Frankel and Romer [1999] trade instrument was calculated according to the
original description, except with 1950s population data, and making the necessary
modifications so as to include 1950s colonies rather than their modern successors.
Modifications were only made to accommodate the colonies in the dataset, and thus
in the trade estimations Germany is treated as one country rather than two, and
Czechoslovakia is treated as two countries rather than one. There is no reason to
believe that this introduces any bias. In order to make the population and area coef-
ficients in regressions interpretable, only the component of the instrument orthogonal
to log area and log population is used. Since all the tables in Frankel and Romer [1999]
include population and area as regressors, using this new definition of the instrument
would not change any of their results.
For the cross-country regressions using GDP levels, data comes from the CIA
2008, as it appears to be the only organization that provides PPP-adjusted estimates
for all UN member states in a single dataset. These estimates are all for a single
year somewhere in 1999-2006, depending on the country. Only the latest estimate
available for each country is used, and the numbers are normalized by the per capita
GDP of the US during the year in which the estimate was made.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
The objective of the analysis is to show that the theoretical predictions of the model
presented earlier are supported by the data, and that the selection effect implied by
this model has a significant effect on cross-country regressions that have been used in
the literature. Suppose that the countries observed are the outcome of some selection
process, where
Si = I(oYi + 1Xi +- i > 0)
with S = 1 indicating that a given country is observed. Then if a cross-country
regression is run on the set of countries present today using the specification
Yi= oXi + Ei
Then if yo > 0 and T1 < 0, the selection process will result in / being upwardly
biased, since those observations with low Y and high X are mostly eliminated in
the selection stage. First, the selection process will be estimated using a very simple
coding of colonies that should be more or less likely to be annexed, based on whether
there are large neighbouring political jurisdictions. Next, small countries are shown
to have better economic performance, which could be a result of this sort of selection
bias. Finally, the Frankel and Romer [1999] trade instrument is shown to also be
an excellent predictor of which colonies will become independent. When the reduced
form regression run by Frankel and Romer is run using a selected sample of only those
colonies that become independent, a positive and statistically significant coefficient
is obtained, as in the original paper; however, when the Frankel and Romer regres-
sion is run on the larger unselected sample, the coefficient estimated is negative and
insignificant, thus showing the magnitude of the selection bias in this case.
As a first cut, assume that those colonies that are more than 100 miles away
from any landmass 10 times larger than than the colony itself are "far away". Let
BIG NEIGHBOURi be a dummy variable equal to 0 in this case, and 1 otherwise.
The following relationship should then hold between Pnnexed and covariates:
Pannexed is decreasing in population
Pannexed is increasing in BIG_NEIGHBOUR
Pannexed is decreasing in GDP per capita
One concern is that population is endogenous. If, during the colonial period,
population growth were negatively correlated with GDP per capita, as is the case
today, then we would expect that countries with small surface areas that also had
low per capita GDP would have experienced higher population growth, and thus
would have a higher population when decolonization was occurring. If this were true,
then holding surface area constant, poorer countries would be more likely to become
independent because of their higher population.
Historical data, however, shows that this is not the case. As shown in Table 2.2,
until the latter part of the 20th century, population growth and per capita GDP were
positively correlated. Thus, a small surface area colony that had high GDP per capita
would see higher population growth, which would then lead to independence. This
is one potential explanation for why there is a robust relationship between surface
area and per capita GDP, even though there is no reason to believe that there is any
causal effect of surface area on per capita GDP.
A further issue is that today there are still a number of colonies, mostly small
islands or groups of islands. This complicates the analysis, since it is not clear what
group should be analysed. Two types of analysis will thus be presented: first, a linear
probability model on only those colonies that have been decolonized, either through
annexation or independence; second, a hazard model following Fine and Gray [1999]
with competing risks of annexation and independence, which treats current colonies
as observations censored at 2000.
One final problem is determining which colonies actually became independent, and
which were annexed. For this, two authorities are compared: the United Nations, and
the Penn World Tables. If a colony shows up as a UN member and is listed in the
Penn World Tables (either in the main dataset or in the appendix as a country for
which data is missing), then it is judged to be independent. If it shows up in neither,
then it is classified as annexed unless it is still a British Overseas Territory or a French
Overseas Collectivity. The cases where there is a disagreement between the UN and
PWT are dropped.1
Columns I-IV of Table 2.3 show that the predicted relationships are observed
in the data, with size and economic performance being negatively correlated with
17 Bermuda, the Netherlands Antilles, Hong Kong, Macau, and East Timor.
annexation, and the presence of a large neighbour positively correlated.
2.4.1 Explanation for failure to find scale effects
Many papers have looked for scale effects at the country level, but with very little
success. Backus et al. [1992], for instance, finds no evidence for scale effects for total
output, but does point to some evidence of effects in the manufacturing sector. More
recently, Easterly and Kraay [2000] not only fail to find evidence that larger countries
perform better, but in fact conclude that smaller countries have higher GDP, at least
in levels. While Easterly and Kraay [2000] defined "small" in terms of population,
Table 2.4 shows that this relationship is also true for surface area. Column II in Table
2.4 shows that this negative relationship is due mostly to countries with a surface area
of less than 50,000km 2 (Switzerland is 41,000km 2 ), and that it is in fact not related to
countries with smaller surface having smaller populations, nor because island nations
are smaller than continental ones."8 Columns IV-VI show that these results hold for
levels as well as growth rates.19
Columns III and VII show that the coefficient on surface area falls by more than
50% and becomes statistically insignificant when institutional covariates are included.
This suggests that - as might be expected- small surface area is not directly respon-
sible for economic growth, but rather small countries have other characteristics that
are positively correlated with economic growth. This is consistent with Sala-i-Martin
et al. [2004], which considers 67 potential determinants of growth, and finds that land
area is statistically significant in only 1% of their regression specifications.
Obviously many explanations can be offered for why smaller countries appear to
perform better than larger ones. Unfortunately, it is not possible to simply repeat
18Differences might be expected in the regressions on GDP levels vs. GDP growth, since one
might expect countries such as Kuwait and Brunei to have very high GDP levels but not very high
growth rates. As the number of small resource rich countries is limited, it is not possible to test this
empirically.
19Knack and Azfar [2000] demonstrate that models containing variables correlated with country
size are sensitive to sample selection issues, because often data is collected for all large countries,
but only "good" small countries. The sample for columns IV-VII is the 192 UN member states, thus
suggesting that selective data collection is not responsible for the observed results. The argument
presented in the rest of this paper is that selection into the international state system - not selection
in terms of data availability - is the cause of the results in Table 2.4.
the exercise performed in the previous section, since the negative correlation between
area and output per capita is strong in both the selected and unselected sample;
however, Figure 2-2 offers suggestive evidence that selection is once again increasing
the estimated slope.
Additional interesting cases are those of Nauru and Kiribati, two of the smallest
members of the UN in terms of population. Both colonies had substantial phosphate
deposits, and particularly in the case of Nauru the retention of a greater proportion
of the rents from this resource was a major motivation for independence. In the
absence of phosphates, Nauru seemed likely to remain a dependency or merged into
some other country. An example in the other direction is Sikkim, and independent
state under British indirect rule just to the north of British India. Political turmoil
and poor economic performance led to its progressive incorporation into India, and
by the end of the 1970s it no longer held any special status.
During the colonial period, growth in population and growth in GDP per capita
appear to have been positively correlated, as shown in Table 2.2. If economically
successful areas experienced a quickly growing population, as was the case in Singa-
pore, for example, and if there are fixed costs to being independent, as assumed in
the model presented above, then small surface area colonies that were successful will
be more likely to become independent. Due to relatively poor historical population
records, particularly for smaller jurisdictions, it is unfortunately difficult to analyze
this possibility carefully.
2.4.2 Evidence of selection bias
Frankel and Romer [1999] show that distance to potential trading partners can be
used as an instrument for actual trade flows, and that the IV estimates for "benefits
of trade" using this instrument are positive and statistically significant. In fact, they
obtain IV estimates that are higher than the corresponding OLS estimates, despite
the fact that the OLS regression would seem to be biased upwards due to omitted
variables. Table 2.5 shows that the instrument used in Frankel and Romer [1999]
is also good predictor of which colonies will eventually become independent. This is
because a high score on the Frankel and Romer instrument indicates a country close to
many large countries, and thus likely to be engaging in a great deal of trade. However,
a colony with a low Frankel and Romer score (i.e. a country far away from trading
partners) is also not as profitable to rule as part of some amalgamated jurisdiction,
since there is likely to be a considerable loss due to the high distance involved. On the
other hand, colonies with high Frankel and Romer scores have neighbours with which
they could amalgamate with much smaller resulting distance-related losses. Thus, out
of the set of small colonies with high Frankel and Romer scores, only the ones with
the highest levels of per capita production will likely become independent countries.
On the other hand, the small colonies with low Frankel and Romer scores are likely
to become independent regardless of their economic strength or weakness. Table 2.6
shows that, although the Frankel and Romer score is uncorrelated with government
revenue per capita in the full sample of colonies (column I), when we consider only
those colonies that became independent, there is a statistically significant positive
correlation (column II). Thus, the correlation of the Frankel and Romer instrument
with economic performance (columns II-III) appears to be due to this selection effect,
and not an actual causal relationship. Figure 2-3 shows exactly which points are
being omitted due to selection. 20
Table 2.6 shows that examining only currently independent countries changes the
coefficient on the Frankel and Romer [1999] instruments from -0.45 to 4.96, an bias
of +5.41. If the simplest selection model, the one in column I of Table 2.5, is taken
as the true model, then the predicted bias (calculated via 1000 random draws from
the estimated parameter covariance matrix for the selection model) is +2.74, with a
standard error of 0.87. Thus, the simplest selection model explains about half the
observed bias. One interesting feature is that if the selection model and the value
of its parameters were known, but only the selected sample were observed, trying to
infer the bias by calculating the inverse Mills ratio at the observed data points would
yield a bias estimate only half as large. This is because some annexed colonies (such
20 Although Dutch New Guinea ("XNG") is an obvious outlier (perhaps due to difficulties with
the Dutch financial statistics), the results are the same if it is omitted.
as Sarawak, North Borneo, and French and Portuguese India) have covariates that are
more extreme than anything in the observed sample. Thus, the attempt to estimate
the bias using the observed distribution of covariates fails because the estimate is
based on a finite sample, and the actual true covariate distribution is different than
the one in the observed sample. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to correctly
estimate the degree of bias without having access to the unselected sample.
2.5 Conclusion
The observed set of currently independent countries is a selected sample from a larger
set of potential countries. Small colonies that were economically successful were likely
to become independent countries, while those that were economically unsuccessful
were more likely to merge with nearby jurisdiction. This effect was stronger where
there were other jurisdictions nearby. This selection effect explains why small coun-
tries often appear to do better in terms of GDP levels and growth, even though scale
effects suggest that they should do worse. The selection effect also changes the co-
efficient on the Frankel and Romer [1999] geography instrument from negative and
insignificant to positive and significant. Future regressions using cross-country data
should take into account that the unit of observation is endogenous, and thus, de-
pending on the variables being included, coefficient estimates may be biased. The
breakup of larger colonial jurisdictions has not been analysed in this paper, although
it is obviously related to the annexation of smaller colonies. The partition of British
India and the independence of the subdivisions of French West Africa are the two
most notable cases. In order to take into account these events, the model could be
extended to allow for the entry of new dictators that could attempt to take over a por-
tion of an existing jurisdiction. In this way, jurisdictions that are very large could be
reduced in size through separations. 21 While there are not nearly enough data points
210ne difficulty introduced with this sort of extension is that areas that have growing GDP per
capita should see an increasing number of jurisdictions, but the separations mentioned happened
in some of the poorest colonies. An explanation is thus needed for why richer parts of the world
experienced decentralization rather than (successful) separatist movements.
for statistical significance, it does seem that the very largest countries in terms of sur-
face area (Russia, Canada, the United States, and China) do better than somewhat
smaller countries. This could be explained if there was a separate selection effect,
where rulers differed in their ability (or institutional quality), and countries that had
high quality were less likely to suffer breakups. However, introducing separatism
creates significant additional difficulties.
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log(POPULATIO
log(AREA)
log(REVENUE/P
log(GDP)
BIG NEIGHBOI
FR GRAVITY_
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD
N) 5.53 2.22
3.11 2.46
OPULATION) 1.57 1.04
8.14 1.16
JR 0.61 0.49
INST 0.00 0.12
POPULATION is in thousands of people, plus one.
AREA is in thousands of square kilometers, plus one.
REVENUE is in thousands of pounds sterling.
GDP is for 2000, PPP adjusted per capita, from Heston et al. [2006].
BIG_NEIGHBOUR was coded by inspection from CIA maps.
FRGRAVITY_INST is the Frankel and Romer [1999] instrument, modified as ap-
propriate.
Max.
10.19
8.45
4.30
10.29
1.00
0.55
Min.
0.83
0.01
-0.17
6.52
0.00
-0.18
Table 2.2: Dependent Variable is POP_GROWTH
tl 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1950
t2 1820 1870 1913 1950 2000 2000
log(GDPt,) 0.0015 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0046* 0.0008 -0.0054*
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0012)
GDP GROWTH 1.9189* 0.4472* 0.3149 0.1800 -0.3193* -0.2476*
(0.3238) (0.1112) (0.2308) (0.0997) (0.0543) (0.0817)
N 32 57 66 68 144 68t
tl 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1950
t2 1820 1870 1913 1950 2000 2000
log(GDPt)
GDP GROWTH
REGIONM
N
0.0008
(0.0025)
2.2703*
(0.4499)
X
32
0.0025
(0.0039)
0.3498
(0.1766)
X
0.0074*
(0.0029)
0.2644
(0.2170)
X
0.0026
(0.0021)
0.2034*
(0.0914)
X
0.0031*
(0.0009)
-0.1514*
(0.0433)
X
143
0.0000
(0.0014)
-0.0694
(0.0632)
X
68t
t Sample in last column is restricted to the 1913 -- 1950 column sample.
POP GROWTH = log(POPULATIONt2 )-log(POPULATIONt,)
t2 -tl
POPULATION is from Maddison et al. [2006].
GDP GROWTH = (log(GDPt 2 )-log(POPULATIONt 2 ))-(log(GDPtj)-log(POPULATIONt))t2-tl
GDP is PPP-adjusted, also from Maddison et al..
REGIONM is a set of dummy variables corresponding to Maddison et al.'s 7 geo-
graphic regions.
Table 2.3: Dependent Variable is Annexation
log(POPULATION)
s.e.
log(AREA)
s.e.
log(REVENUE/POPULATION)
s.e.
BIG.NEIGHBOUR
s.e.
N
Linear Probability
I II
(no controls) (controls)
-0.081 -0.056
(0.030) (0.034)
-0.028 -0.032
(0.022) (0.023)
-0.192 -0.210
(0.050) (0.061)
0.321 0.301
(0.102) (0.109)
60 60
Competing Risks
III IV
(no controls) (controls)
- 0.223 - 0.878
(0.117) (0.452)
- 0.285 - 0.504
(0.177) (0.267)
- 1.261 - 2.704
(0.365) (1.334)
11.971 15.653
(0.613) (0.880)
70 70
For LPM, controls are for continent (as defined by Maddison) and colonizer. For competing risks model, large numbers of
dummy variables appears to make convergence difficult - results are shown controlling only for colonizer. Similar results are
obtained controlling only for continent.
log(AREA)
Table 2.4: Relationship between GDP and Surface Area
Dep. Var.: GDP GROWTH Dependent Variable: log(GDP)
I II III IV V VI VII
-0.0029*
(0.0006)
...part under 50000km 2
...dummy: over 50000km 2
...part over 50000km 2
log(POPULATION)
ISLAND
LATITUDE
INSTITUTIONS
REGION
GDP (cubic)
DECADE
N (countries)
0.0005*
(0.0001)
x
x
169
-0.0051*
(0.0026)
-0.0007
(0.0054)
-0.0014
(0.0018)
0.0006
(0.0014)
0.0042
(0.0050)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
X
X
X
169
-0.0020
(0.0017)
-0.0022
(0.0045)
-0.0009
(0.0013)
X
X
X
X
168
-0.1031*
(0.0302)
0.0431*
(0.0041)
192
-0.2289
(0.1237)
0.0024
(0.2246)
0.0028
(0.0776)
0.0376
(0.0619)
0.4313
(0.2563)
0.0074
(0.0097)
192
-0.2282*
(0.1076)
0.0032
(0.0681)
0.0376
(0.0614)
0.4318
(0.2525)
0.0074
(0.0095)
X
192
-0.0546
(0.0552)
0.0084
(0.0401)
X
X
186
Notes to Table 2.4
For columns I-III, estimation assumes random effects by country. Columns IV-VII are OLS with a single cross-section, and
the sample is restricted to the 192 UN member states.
GDPi, = rgdpch,t , where rgdpch is constant-price PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, to account for an advancing technologicalrgdpchusA, t
frontier. For columns I-III data for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 is used, taken from Heston et al. [2006]. For columns
IV-VII, CIA data is used.
GDP GROWTHi,t = 1og(GDPi,t)-log(GDPi,t_1o)
AREA is the surface area, in thousands of square kilometres, plus one. It is taken from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators.
...part under 50000km 2 is equal to min(log(AREA), log(50000)).
...dummy: over 50000km 2 is equal to 1 if AREA > 50000.
...part over 50000(km) 2 is equal to max(log(AREA) - log(50000),0).
POPULATION, for columns I-III, is from Heston et al. [2006], and data from 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 is used. Equivalent
results are obtained if 1950 data is used for all decades. Data for columns IV-VII is from the Center.
ISLAND is a dummy variable equal to one if the country has no land borders, according to the Center. According to this
definition Australia is an island but the UK is not (because of the land border with Ireland). Most other definitions appear
equally problematic.
LATITUDE is the distance from the country's capital to the equator, in degrees.
INSITUTIONS are the five governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. [2007].
REGION is a set of 21 dummy variables corresponding to the regional groupings used by the UN Statistics Division.
Table 2.5: Dependent Variable is Annexation
Linear Probability
I II
Competing Risks
III IV
(no controls) (controls) (no controls) (controls)
log(POPULATION) -0.063 -0.046 0.074 -0.425
s.e. (0.027) (0.029) (0.137) (0.255)
log(AREA) -0.018 -0.033 -0.374 -0.789
s.e. (0.020) (0.020) (0.164) (0.290)
log(REVENUE/POPULATION) -0.145 -0.181 -1.533 -4.308
s.e. (0.048) (0.054) (0.342) (1.427)
FR.GRAVITY.INST 1.696 2.173 5.862 14.449
s.e. (0.383) (0.429) (2.144) (3.473)
N 60 60 70 70
See notes for Table 2.3.
Figure 2-1: Government Revenue per capita as a proxy for GDP
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Revenue per capita, c. 1950
Figure 2-2: Area and Government Revenue per capita
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Table 2.6: Relationship between Frankel and Romer [1999] instrument and output
Unselected Selected
I II III
dep. var. rev/pop dep.var. rev/pop dep.var. gdp
log(POPULATION) -0.110 -0.151 -0.035
s.e. (0.082) (0.077) (0.110)
log(AREA) -0.104 -0.171 -0.279
s.e. (0.053) (0.055) (0.079)
FR.GRAVITY.INST -0.454 4.955 3.769
s.e. (1.194) (1.752) (2.489)
N 60 51 51
The "unselected" sample consists of all colonies that either became independent or
were annexed by a neighbour. The "selected" sample consists only of those colonies
that become independent. Current colonies are not included, but their inclusion does
not significantly change the results. Controls for colonizing power are included.
Table 2.7: Non-standard ISO codes used in graphs
XCF
XEA
XIC
XIF
XIP
XIS
XNB
XNG
XSO
XSW
XWA
Cameroon (French)
Equatorial Africa (French)
Indo-china (French)
India (French)
India (Portugese)
Ifni (Spanish)
North Borneo (British)
New Guinea (Dutch)
Somaliland (British)
Sarawak (British)
West Africa (French)
Figure 2-3: Relationship between Frankel and Romer [1999] instrument and output
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Chapter 3
Endogeneity of Ethnolinguistic
Fragmentation and Implications
3.1 Introduction
"The region in which the native language is termed French," reports the 1910 En-
cyclopaedia Britannica, "consists of the northern half of France (including Lorraine)
and parts of Belgium and Switzerland." This statement seems somewhat at odds
with more recent conventional wisdom. Similarly, although the 2007 Britannica Book
of the Year has no problem reporting that 94% of people in Italy speak Italian na-
tively, the 1910 Britannica describes the country as one where "real linguistic unity
is far from existing." Over the 20th century, France, Italy, and many other coun-
tries have changed from nations with considerable linguistic diversity to ones where
the vast majority of residents have the same mother tongue. Since native language
is frequently used as an identifier for ethnic groups, including by the oft-cited At-
las Narodov Mira [1964], linguistic homogenization likely lowers the level of ethnic
fragmentation reported. To the extent that this linguistic change is correlated with
omitted variables, regressions involving ethnic fragmentation as an independent vari-
able will generate biased coefficient estimates. As described in Alesina and Ferrara
[2005], these regressions have become increasingly popular over the past decade.
In many of the papers in this literature, the authors note that ethnic identity is
potentially endogenous: Alesina et al. [2003] describes the case of Somalia, where a
previously "homogenous" country turned into one with many warlord clans after a
civil war. In general, though, this is not further investigated, and regressions with
fragmentation as a RHS variable are analysed under the assumption that endogeneity
and omitted variables are not serious problems.' This position, however, appears to
be relatively new. Fishman et al. [1968], in an examination of the relationship between
linguistic fragmentation and a variety of development outcomes, described a rather
different consensus:
Linguistic homogeneity is currently related to many more of the "good"
and "desirable" characteristics of polities than is linguistic heterogeneity
... In most instances linguistic (and more generally, cultural) homogeneity
has been interpreted as a consequence of the other processes and char-
acteristics enumerated above. Linguistic and cultural parochialism and
particularism have usually been interpreted as giving ground as man be-
comes ever more at home with the delights and complexities of society on
a larger and presumably higher scale.
This statement describes the "modernist" position: that the ethnolinguistic clas-
sification of an individual is the outcome of relatively recent political, social, and
economic processes, dating back in most cases no earlier than the 18th century. Op-
posed to this is the "primordialist" position, which holds, in its strongest form, that
the ethnicity of any individual can be determined by examining their ancestry, since
the ethnic groups present today were cohesive and identifiable even thousands of years
in the past [Smith, 2004].2 The first modern statement of the primordialist position
is generally attributed to Fichte [1808]: "Those who speak the same language are
joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before
any human art begins ... From this internal boundary, which is drawn by the spiri-
tual nature of man himself, the marking of the external boundary by dwelling place
results as a consequence." The modernist position developed mainly after the Second
1Campos and Kuzeyev [2007] is a recent exception.
2 Smith further identifies "perennialism" as a third possibility: that nations or ethnic groupings
are mutable, but that they are not a modern phenomenon, and distinct ethnic groups could be
identified long before the modern era. Since no ethnic data from before the 18th century has been
used in this paper, the disagreement between the modernist position and the perennialist one is
irrelevant.
World War, with the precise nature of the argument differing depending on the au-
thor. Gellner [1983] claims that linguistic homogenization and the rise of nationalism
is a result of industrialization, Anderson [1983] points to the emergence of widespread
literacy and the development of "print capitalism", while Hobsbawm [1990] focuses
on the incentives of the government and the elite.3
In addition to these broad surveys of the development of nations and ethnic iden-
tity, a considerable amount of work has been done on individual nations or ethnic
groups. Weber [1976], in his classic study of nation-building in France, argues that
linguistic homogenization was partially the result of a centralized education system,
combined with a transportation network connecting rural populations to larger mar-
kets. Lodge [1993] outlines the process by which this new official language gradually
replaced the local patois as the mother tongue of the next generation.4 Mauro [1963]
claims that at the time of Italian unification, only a tiny fraction of the population was
able to speak what was later defined as Italian, and Misiunas et al. [1993] describes
the ultimate failure of Russification in the case of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
In all of these cases, the effectiveness or lack thereof of central institutions figures
prominently.
This paper re-examines the older viewpoint reported by Fishman et al., a position
that is effectively modernist rather than primordialist. 5 City size and population at
the beginning of the 20th century, as well as surface area, are used as proxies for the
effectiveness of central administrative institutions, and countries with large cities rel-
ative to their overall population in 1900 have lower levels of linguistic fragmentation
in 2000 than in 1960. Ecological evidence shows that this is not a spurious correla-
tion caused by measurement error. Two regressions using fragmentation as a RHS
variable are then examined: the relationship between fragmentation and economic
growth, and the relationship between fragmentation and corruption. The former was
popularized by Easterly and Levine [1997], who analyzed cross-country per capita
3
"Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around" [Hobsbawm, 1990].
4 More recently, this is also covered from a different perspective by Robb [2007].
5In general, the recent empirical literature acknowledges that the modernist view is likely correct,
but then analyzes data assuming primordialism.
GDP changes for 1960-1990. The latter was used by Mauro [1995] to form an in-
strument in order to examine the effects of corruption on investment. To the extent
that effective institutions affect economic growth and corruption directly, OLS may
overestimate the negative effect of fragmentation in these cases if the relationship
between institutions and homogenization is not controlled for. Re-running these re-
gressions with the addition of proxies for centralization cuts the coefficient on ethnic
fragmentation roughly in half and makes it statistically insignificant.
3.2 Model of Centralization and Linguistic Homog-
enization
The model presented below would treat both the French education system and road
network as decreasing the cost of joining the dominant ethnic group, while at the same
time increasing the productivity of at least some members of that group. Because of
the low costs of joining the dominant group, and high benefits, linguistic minorities in
France steadily shrank in size over the past two and a half centuries. However, other
countries, such as Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium, have efficient eduction systems
and road networks, and maintain one or more large minority language groups while
still having very high GDP per capita. While intuition suggests that there ought
to be returns to scale in language, there is remarkably little empirical evidence that
countries and regions with less-popular languages - such as Iceland or Catalonia -
underperform. Thus, it could be that linguistic homogenization, while correlated with
economic growth, is not a significant cause of that growth.
To formalize this, consider a model where a country consists of a dominant lin-
guistic group and a minority. The population is of mass 1, and a fraction s of it is part
of the minority group. For exogenous historical reasons, there is institutional quality
associated with these two groups, Ad and A, respectively. Each individual belongs to
one of these two groups, and ability -y drawn from some distribution. There are two
goods produced: L and H. Every individual can produce either 1 unit of L, or Ay
units of H. Utility is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, with u(h, 1) = h'l 1- '. Normalize
the price of L to 1. A member of the minority can join the dominant group by paying
a cost c, which then allows production of H at Ad7 rather than A,y. Assuming a
sufficiently large support for y, in equilibrium there will be some price p for H, mem-
bers of the dominant group with 7 > y* will choose to produce H, members of the
minority group with 7 > 7y will choose to produce H, and members of the minority
group with 7 > j will choose to pay c to produce H with the dominant group. This
equilibrium is described by four equations. First, the allocation of labour for members
of the dominant ethnic group must be in equilibrium, which requires that the least
productive (i.e. lowest y) individual producing in the H sector should be obtaining
the same income as if he were in the L sector. Since the price of L is set to be one,
then
py*Ad = 1 (3.1)
where y* is the productivity of the least productive individual producing in the
H sector. The allocation of labour for members of the minority group is slightly
more complicated, since there are three viable options: an individual could produce
L, produce H using the minority group's institutions, or join the dominant group and
produce H using the dominant group's institutions. As long as the support of the
distribution of y is sufficiently broad, there will always be some individuals, both in
the minority group and the dominant group, who will choose to produce L. However,
depending on the precise parameter values, there may or may not be any members
of the minority group that produce H using minority institutions:
p*Am = 1 or 7* = 7 (3.2)
Here the second case is used when -7 would be greater than j in the other case,
an impossibility since 7 is defined as the changeover point from using minority insti-
tutions to produce H to using the dominant group's institutions to produce H. Since
there is a fixed cost to the joining the dominant ethnic group, that group's institu-
tions are assumed to result in higher productivity, and individual level productivity
(through 7) and these institutions are complementary, only the individuals with the
highest y will choose to join the dominant group. Of the individuals who choose to
join the dominant group, the one with the lowest y will be the one such that the fixed
cost of joining is precisely equal to the difference in revenue:
pYAm = pyAd - c (3.3)
Finally, it must be the case that markets for L and H clear. Only one of these
needs to be checked, since the other will then be implied. For the H market, the total
amount available is determined by the production of H by individuals in the minority
group producing using minority institutions, by individuals in the minority group who
choose to join the dominant group and produce using the dominant institutions, and
by individuals in the dominant group. The Cobb-Douglas utility function implies
that all those who produce H will choose to keep a fraction a of their output, and
sell the other 1 - a, and similarly those producing in the L sector will choose to keep
a fraction 1 - a of their output and sell the other a at a price of 1. Thus, the market
clearing condition for the H market is
p(1 - a) (s 7Amnih ()d-y + s f ?Adf~ (7)d + (1 - s) 7Adf(7)dy) (3.4)
= a (sF,(y-y)(1 
- s)F,(y*))
To summarize, Equation 3.1 requires that the member of the dominant group at
the cutoff point between producing H and L is indifferent between the two options,
while Equation 3.2 requires the same to be true for the individual at the equivalent
cutoff point for the minority group. Equation 3.3 requires that the member of the
minority group at the cutoff for joining the majority is indifferent given the fixed cost
but increased productivity of this option, while Equation 3.4 requires that the goods
markets clear at the price p.
If we suppose that the members of the minority who have paid the cost of c, and
are producing H using the dominant groups insitutions will be treated as members
of the dominant group, then the cutoff is of particular interest, since F( ) is the
fraction of the minority group that is homogenized.
Proposition 3. With this model of linguistic homogenization, the following state-
ments are true:
1. j is decreasing in Ad
2. IT is increasing in A,
3. j' is increasing in c
Proof. 1. From equation 3.3, we have y = p(AC-Am). For any Am > 0, then, 7 will be
decreasing in Ad if pAd is increasing in Ad. This is true for y' < 9, however, since in
the extreme case where only people using the dominant group's institutions produce
H, then pAd is constant with respect to Ad due to the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Thus, if some production of H is done using minority insitutions, the change in p
must not be as dramatic, and so pAd must be increasing in Ad.
2. j is increasing in Am if p(Ad - Am) is decreasing in Am, which is true if pA,
is increasing in Am, which is true by an argument similar to the above.
3. Once again using equation 3.3, we have = Ad-A The second term is
constant with respect to changes in c, so j is increasing in c if ' is increasing in c.
Suppose that this not true. Then an increase in c would result in an increase in p and
a decrease in -, and the increase in p would imply that there should also be decreases
in 7* and 7, which means that 3.4 can no longer hold. Thus, by contradiction y
must be increasing in c. D
In other words, as the dominant institutions improve, homogenization increases,
as the minority institutions improve, homogenization decreases, and as the cost of
homogenizing increases, homogenization decreases. Now suppose that there are mul-
tiple periods, and across periods the dominant ethnic group has a growth rate of nd,
and the minority group nm. For simplicity, assume that the 7 of children is uncor-
related with that of their parents. Then unless nm > nd, the relative population of
the minority group will decrease in over time. This may explain why most minority
groups that are actually observed have a higher fertility rate than the dominant eth-
nic group. Other than natural population growth, the only way to prevent this would
be to provide some incentive for members of the dominant group to join the minority
group. Some language policies seem to have this effect. Another way to escape this
fate is to define group membership on some basis other than language. This may
explain, for example, why a Jewish minority was able to persist in Europe for over
a millenium despite recurring persecution. For these groups, incentives for members
to remain part of the group (such as affirmative action policies in the United States)
may help to maintain its relative size. In this paper, however, attention is restricted
to linguistic groups. In particular, the focus will be on how different levels of Ad
lead to different degrees of linguistic homogenization. Since Ad is also correlated with
output, a higher level of Ad will result in both higher output and a more homogenous
population, even though there is no causal link between linguistic homogeneity and
economic performance. 6
3.3 Empirical Evidence
Unfortunately, there is no good means of measuring the Ad and A, terms in the
model presented above; however, it seems likely that a country with no cities of any
noticeable size would probably have a fairly low Ad. Without any sort of bureaucracy
or structure in place to allow talented individuals to direct large organizations, it
seems unlikely that productivity would be high. In particular, since Ad is referring to
the institutions of the dominant ethnic group, attention will be focused on the size
of the largest city as a proxy for the existence of strong institutions for the dominant
group. 7 Since it is not possible to measure Ad, it is not possible to assess directly
whether the size of the largest city is correlated with it. However, the size of the
6 That is, the difference in output is due only to the fact that A, < Ad by assumption, and if a
new minority group were created with Am = Ad there would be no decrease in production in the
economy.
7If the largest city is increasing in size when the Am - that is, the institutional quality of minority
groups - is decreasing, then this would result in a higher calculated correlation between city size and
homogenization, but a lower one between city size and growth.
largest city is a good predictor of other national characteristics, such as the degree
of fiscal centralization.8 It would be odd if a more productive dominant ethnic group
had a small principal city. Am is assumed to vary randomly, and thus a higher Ad
implies a higher Ad - Am on average, and thus faster linguistic homogenization.
The estimation strategy will use a simple specification, due to the difficulty of
estimating a structural model given the quality of the data available. In particular,
suppose that linguistic fragmentation evolves as follows:
LFi,t = ao + ajLFi,t-1 + a2Ad,i + Vi,t (3.5)
where LFi,t is the standard Herfindahl index of linguistic fragmentation for country i
at time t. Then, if a1 - 1 and ao - 0, LF will tend to change the most in countries
which have the dominant ethnic groups with the best institutions, whereas it will
remain close to constant in countries where these institutions are very poor. In the
regressions actually run, the size of the largest city in 1900 will be used as a proxy
for Ad.
Population data for 1900 is taken from Lahmeyer [2006], who draws from a wide
variety of published sources. City size data comes from Bairoch and Eggimann [1995]
for developing countries and Mitchell [2003] for developed countries, with missing
cases filled in from Lahmeyer. 9 Reliable world-wide data sources for linguistic frag-
mentation only become available in the 20th century, and so only two periods will be
considered: LF 19 60 and LF 2000 . Data for LF1 960 comes from the Roeder [2001] coding
of Atlas Narodov Mira [1964] data. LF 2000 data comes from the Alesina et al. [2003]
'Arzaghi and Henderson [2005] argue that administrative centralization is associated with ur-
ban centralization. Thus, with appropriate controls, the largest city in a country should be larger
when the country is more centralized. To verify this, they use the relationship between central
government and local government expenditures as a measure of centralization, and predict this fiscal
centralization using contemporary city size, population, and surface area. The first column in Table
3.3 shows that they obtain results consistent with their claim, while the second column shows that
generally similar results can be obtained when 1900 city size and population data is used instead
of contemporary data. This early measurement is necessary to properly test the effects of central-
ization on linguistic homogenization, as otherwise it could be that randomly occurring linguistic
homogenization increases the benefits to living together in a city, thus causing increased city size.
9Current national borders are used to assign cities to countries on the grounds that ELF indices
are calculated using current borders.
coding of Encyclopedia Britannica data. 10
Figure 3-1 gives a rough indication of how ALF is related to the (relative) size
of the largest city, and Table 3.4 shows regressions predicting LF 2000 using LF1 960
and proxies for centralization. In column III, the coefficient of -0.0375 on CITYPOP
implies that if Chad had stronger institutions in 1900, such that its largest city
(N'Djamena) had a population of 1 x exp(3) _ 20 thousand instead of the 1 thousand
that it did, then it would have a linguistic fractionalization index today about 3 x
0.0375 _ 0.11 lower than it actually does. 1
If LF 1960 is measured with error, and if historical ethnic fragmentation affects
city size, CITYPOP could be significant in Table 3.4 not because fragmentation
has actually changed between 1960 and 2000, but rather because CITYPOP contains
additional information about the true level of fragmentation beyond what is in LF 19 60.
In order to test for this possibility, some estimate for LFo - fragmentation in an even
earlier period- is needed so that the relationship between LF, LF 1960 , and LF 2000
can be analyzed.
It is well accepted in the anthropology literature that biodiversity and ethnic
diversity are positively correlated [Maffi, 2005], a finding that has been verified by
ecologists [Sutherland, 2003] and is illustrated in Figure 3-2.12 Table 3.4 shows that
there is a positive correlation between the number of species of mammals in a given
country and its level of linguistic fragmentation. Assuming extinction is not a major
problem, the diversity of mammals thus provides a proxy for LF. If measurement
error were driving the results in columns I-III, we would expect mammals to enter
positively in column VI, as it provides additional information about the true level
of linguistic fragmentation. Instead, the coefficient is negative and significant. This
10In cases where the ANM ethnic divisions are clearly not linguistic (such as Israel, where the
population is divided into "Arab" and "Jew"), I substitute using the Roeder [2001] coding of Muller
[1964]. I also changed the Alesina coding in some cases where it appeared to be incorrect, and in
others where it was either internally inconsistent or at variance with ANM classifications.
"
1 This assumes that no homogenization happens before 1960, which, in the case of newly decolo-
nized countries such as Chad, may be close to being correct.
12Michalopoulos [2008] examines the relationship between variation in land characteristics - par-
ticularly suitability for agriculture - and linguistic fragmentation. Since species diversity is probably
dependent on land quality, he is likely examining, in the end, the same channel as Maffi and Suther-
land.
is inconsistent with the measurement error explanation, but fits well with the claim
that linguistic homogenization has been occurring over long periods of time. That
is, areas with a high LF relative to LF 1960 are places where homogenization occured
prior to 1960, and the negative coefficient on mammals means that these are also
places where homogenization occurred in the 1960-2000 period.
3.4 Effect of Fragmentation on Economic Growth
Easterly and Levine [1997] find significant effects of ethnolinguistic fragmentation on
growth during the 1960-1990 period. This finding can be replicated using more recent
linguistic fragmentation data and growth data through to 2000. Column V in Table
3.5 shows that, ceteris paribus, a totally homogenous country should have an annual
growth rate 1.7% higher than a totally fragmented one. 13 If we believe that strong
central institutions are both good for growth and cause linguistic homogenization,
then including proxies for these should reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on
linguistic fragmentation. This occurs as predicted, as shown in columns IV and VI.
The importance of country surface area - instead of country population - is somewhat
of a surprise. The results are not being driven by microstates, however: excluding
countries with surface area of less than 1000km 2 does not substantially change the
results. Column III shows that controlling for surface area alone does not reduce the
coefficient on linguistic fragmentation nearly as much as controlling for area and city
population, as in Column IV.
3.5 Effect of Fragmentation on Corruption
Mauro [1995] finds a significant positive correlation between ethnolinguistic fragmen-
tation and corruption in the 1980s. This finding can be replicated using more recent
linguistic fragmentation and corruption data, as shown by Columns I and III in Table
13This coefficient estimate is close (relative to standard errors) to the 2.0% estimate that Easterly
and Levine obtained using several additional controls. notes that there is some evidence the the
coefficient is higher for Africa than other locations, but it is difficult to test this because of high
standard errors.
3.6. Once again, including proxies for strong central institutions reduces the magni-
tude of the coefficient on corruption and makes it insignificant, as shown in columns
II and IV. These results are broadly similar to the results described for growth re-
gressions, above.
3.6 Extensions
Suppose that a country with high output of H has the possibility of accepting im-
migrants. Supposing for simplicity that there is currently no minority group in the
country, then in the case where F(7y*) < 1/2, and A, low there is interest in accepting
immigrants, particularly if c is high (for example, because of complete unfamiliarity
with the local language and culture). This is because most of the immigrants will
produce L, and adding an immigrant that produces L will raise p and thus the utility
of those producing H.14
Now suppose that the cost c is actually a policy variable set by the national gov-
ernment (one example of this would be the difficulty of obtaining a license to practice
medecine with a foreign education), and that the government also performs some
redistribution through a proportional tax, 7. For a sufficiently small T, immigration
is still desirable, and the optimal choice of c is not infinite, since the immigrants with
very high 7 would be contributing a larger amount taxes if they were producing H.
Even if everyone is taxed, but only those in the dominant group (including those
immigrants who have paid c) receive transfers, there is still an incentive to allow im-
migrants with very high y to produce H.15 However, if there were also another source
of revenue to provide these transfers, such as oil exports, and immigrants would only
receive the transfers if they paid c, then as the revenues obtained from this other
source increase, so does the optimal level of c. This is seen in countries such as
Kuwait, where "first class" citizenship, which includes the right to large transfers, is
14It will also decrease y*, and if c is sufficiently high, then eventually almost all the non-immigrants
will be producing H, and would prefer to admit as many immigrants as possible so that p goes even
higher. Thus in this case the level of immigration is determined only by the potential immigrant's
outside option.
15The assumption throughout is that A, is effectively zero in the case of immigrants.
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effectively unattainable, since it is restricted to those who were resident since colo-
nial times. Thus, if immigrants are only considered homogenized when they pay c,
countries with large fixed sources of revenue should see lower rates of homogenization
than those dependent on tax revenues.
A further extension would be to see at least some types of ethnic cleansing as
being prompted by minorities collecting large rents of some form, most likely from
the land that they occupy. However, the purpose of this paper is to show how a
correlation between ethnic fragmentation and economic performance can exist even
in the absence of ethnic conflict or other causal links, and since ethnic cleansing by
definition involves ethnic conflict, this would require a substantially different model.' 6
3.7 Conclusion
Linguistic fragmentation is the result of a long-term process that depends in part
on the nature of institutions in the country in question. A decrease in linguistic
fragmentation during the latter part of the 20th century is correlated with proxies for
strong institutions at the beginning of the century. Biological evidence shows that
this result is not driven by measurement error in the older fragmentation index.
Because of the relationship between strong institutions and linguistic homoge-
nization, regressions using fragmentation as an explanatory variable run the risk of
having the coefficient on fragmentation biased upwards because these institutions are
unobservable. Including a proxy for institutions substantially lowers the coefficient
on fragmentation in regressions predicting growth and corruption. Further studies
of the effects of ethnolinguistic fragmentation on economic outcomes should carefully
consider to what degree fragmentation can be presumed to be exogenous.
16There is also the problem that good data often does not exist in regions which have undergone
this sort of conflict. One notable exception is eastern Europe, where there were dramatic (forced)
shifts in population immediately following World War II. The data for the this region is given in
Table 3.7 in order to demonstrate the magnitude of the changes in fragmentation due to these
population movements.
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Table 3.1: Linguistic fragmentation in Latin America
Colonial c. 1960 c. 2000
Mexico 0.78 0.29 0.15
Guatemala 0.76 0.50 0.46
Peru 0.70 0.51 0.34
Trinidad 0.64 0.56 0.13
El Salvador 0.60 0.16 0.00
Nicaragua 0.59 0.18 0.05
Honduras 0.53 0.16 0.05
Chile 0.52 0.14 0.19
Argentina 0.51 0.31 0.06
Ecuadort 0.48 0.50 0.13
Colombia 0.46 0.06 0.02
Panama 0.39 0.26 0.39
Brazil 0.33 0.07 0.05
Venezuela 0.27 0.11 0.07
Costa Rica 0.15 0.07 0.05
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Notes on Table 3.1
To compute colonial-era (c. 1790-1820) fragmentation, the distribution of languages
was calculated using either census totals or, if those were lacking, period or current es-
timates. With the exception of Trinidad (where the census tabulated English, French,
and Spanish separately), everyone who was not listed as an Indian was assumed to
speak Spanish. Indians were assumed to speak indigenous languages in the propor-
tions given by the World Christian Encyclopedia 1982. Clearly these assumptions are
open to criticism. While it is likely true that almost all mestizos spoke Spanish, it is
not clear that it was always their native langue. Also, it is possible that some classi-
fied as Indians in census documents spoke Spanish as their mother tongue instead of
an Indian language. Furthermore, the distribution of indigenous language speakers
is very likely different now (as recorded in the World Christian Encyclopedia) than
it was during the colonial period. To the extent that all Indians originally spoke an
Indian language, however, and the larger of these languages have survived better than
the smaller ones, then the fractionalization index given is likely accurate for some year
in the past, just not necessarily the early nineteenth century one intended.
t In particular, the colonial-era estimate for Ecuador is problematic: the census
classified two-thirds of the population as Indian, but in the (2005) WCE data, only
one indigenous language is in widespread use in the country, with all others having
only a very small number of speakers. Historically more than one indigenous language
was likely popular, and thus the above estimate is probably much too low.
Data sources:
2000: Encyclopaedia Britannica [2001]
1960: Atlas Narodov Mira [1964]
19th century: Aurea Commons de la Rosa [1995], Browning and Robinson [1977],
Newson [1976], Mamalakis [1978], de Souza e Silva and de Sdo Paulo [1986], Lynch
[2001], Hall et al. [2003].
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Table 3.2:
log(CITYPOP)
8.79
-0.92
3.71
3.91
1.95
193
Summary Statistics
log(COUNTRYPOP)
12.9
-2.1
6.2
6.7
2.7
228
CORRUPTION GROWTH
1.65 17.1%
-2.42 -12.2%
0.00 1.8%
0.27 1.8%
0.98 3.0%
207 176
LF 1960 = linguistic fragmentation c. 1960
LF 2000 = linguistic fragmentation c. 2000
CITYPOP = population of largest city in country c. 1900
COUNTRYPOP = population of country c. 1900
CORRUPTION = inverse of "Control of Corruption" (Kaufmann et al. [2007])
GROWTH = per capita GDP growth in constant dollars, PPP adjusted (Heston et al. [2006])
log(AREA) (surface area in square kilometres) has min 0.7, max 16.9, mean 10.9, and sd 2.9
Max
Min
Mean
Median
SD
N
LF2000
0.97
0.00
0.36
0.32
0.29
217
LF1960
0.97
0.00
0.40
0.36
0.29
152
Table 3.3 : Centralization of Expenditures as dependenl
AH2005 1900pop
log(GDP) -0.1520* -0.0981*
(0.0271) (0.0306)
log(CITYPOP) 0.0970* 0.0550*
(0.0430) (0.0253)
log(COUNTRYPOP) -0.0928* -0.0569*
(0.0367) (0.0252)
log(AREA) -0.0323 0.0022
(0.0192) (0.0115)
DECADE X X
N 103 65
(47 cnt.) (43 cnt.)
t variable
Estimation assumes random effects by country and fixed effects by decade. Central-
ization of expenditures is defined as the share of "general government" expenditures
made by the "central government", using IMF definitions. Arzaghi and Henderson
[2005] use IMF data with contemporaneous GDP per capita, CITYPOP, and COUN-
TRYPOP measures. 1900pop uses IMF data with contemporaneous GDP per capita,
but takes CITYPOP and COUNTRYPOP measures from 1900. The IMF data used
also differs, which accounts for the difference in the number of countries in the sample.
1900pop uses the latest statistics for 1985 and 2005 from the Historical Government
Finance Statistics [2007] and Government Finance Statistics [2007], respectively. For
some reason, the IMF appears to have dropped some data that was published in pre-
vious versions. Only those statistics present in the latest version are used, based on
the assumption that the dropped observations were non-comparable or suffered from
data quality issues. Arzaghi and Henderson [2005] use statistics from 1975, 1985,
and 1995. Although the IMF switched from GFSM1986 (cash-basis) to GFSM2001
(accrual-basis) accounting during the time period in question, the use of decade dum-
mies should prevent this from biasing coefficient estimates.
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Table 3.4: LF 2000 as dependent variable
I II III IV V VI VII
0.9512*
(0.0307)
log(MAMMALS)
log(CITYPOP)
log(COUNTRYPOP)
log(AREA)
LATAMERICA
SSAFRICA
N 142
0.8826*
(0.0404)
-0.0458*
(0.0105)
0.0448*
(0.0139)
-0.0115
(0.0088)
129
0.8458*
(0.0440)
-0.0375*
(0.0106)
0.0302*
(0.0128)
-0.0042
(0.0082)
-0.1138*
(0.0317)
0.0062
(0.0370)
129
0.0988*
(0.0324)
163
0.0772*
(0.0373)
-0.0033
(0.0152)
-0.2132*
(0.0447)
0.2749*
(0.0509)
163
White heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. As in the Global Biodiversity
to countries with an area greater than 5000km2 .
Outlook [2001], columns IV-VII are restricted
1.0235*
(0.0317)
-0.0735*
(0.0211)
0.9193*
(0.0446)
-0.0582*
(0.0201)
0.0160
(0.0098)
-0.0831*
(0.0307)
0.0804*
(0.0277)
130
0.0187
(0.0107)
130
LF 2000
log(CITYPOP)
log(COUNTRYPOP)
log(AREA)
table 3.5: GROWTH
I II
-0.0198* -0.0132*
(0.0055) (0.0059)
0.0050*
(0.0016)
-0.0030*
(0.0014)
as dependent variable
III IV
-0.0166* -0.0079
(0.0055) (0.0055)
0.0033*
(0.0015)
0.00017
(0.0016)
-0.0015* -0.0040*
(0.0006) (0.0009)
SSAFRICA
LATAMERICA
GDP
DECADE
V
-0.0166*
(0.0056)
-0.0175*
(0.0041)
-0.0149*
(0.0037)
X
X
VI
-0.0081
(0.0056)
0.0020
(0.0015)
0.0006
(0.0016)
-0.0033*
(0.0057)
-0.0157*
(0.0043)
-0.0141*
(0.0038)
X
N is fixed at 523 decade-country observations (with 154 countries total) for all regressions to ensure that changes in coefficient
estimates are not due to differences in the sample. Estimation assumes random effects by country, fixed effects by decade, and
a cubic in log GDP per capita relative to the United States.
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Figure 3-1:
Linguistic Homogenization
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Figure 3-2:
Biological Determinants of Linguistic Fragmentation
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Table 3.6: CORRUPTION as dependent variable
I II III IV
LF2000ooo 1.2742* 0.2754 0.6108* 0.2665
(0.2128) (0.2450) (0.2137) (0.2157)
log(GDP) -0.6853* -0.6386*
(0.0714) (0.0679)
log(CITYPOP) -0.3664* -0.1058
(0.0620) (0.0587)
log(COUNTRYPOP) 0.1709* -0.0283
(0.0715) (0.0691)
log(AREA) 0.1336* 0.1162*
(0.0459) (0.0380)
SSAFRICA -0.0110 -0.1381
(0.1647) (0.1528)
LATAMERICA 0.5039* 0.4265*
(0.1372) (0.1492)
N 172 172 139 139
White heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors.
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Table 3.7: Linguistic fragmentation in 20th century Central Europe
pre-WWII population
pre-WWII post-WWII 1960 1990 2000
borders borders
Greece 0.14 0.10 0.14
Austria 0.06 0.13 0.15
Hungary 0.15 0.10 0.01
Finland 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.16
Poland 0.48 0.53 0.03 0.06
Romania 0.47 0.38 0.25 0.20 0.19
Bulgaria 0.33 0.37 0.22 0.28
Albania 0.15 0.09 0.06
Czech Rep. 0.43 0.05 0.08
Slovakia 0.47 0.24
Croatia 0.28 0.14 0.10
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.03 0.04
Serbia 0.42 0.20 0.23
Montenegro 0.11 0.17 0.17
post-WWII "minority language" regions
Kosovo 0.49 0.31 0.22
Slovenia 0.13 0.23 0.29
Macedonia 0.49 0.50 0.52
Belarus 0.34 0.51 0.46
Ukraine 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.46
Moldova 0.66 0.49 0.55 0.41
Lithuania 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.29
Latvia 0.39 0.54 0.60 0.57
Estonia 0.21 0.40 0.53 0.46
The definition of "language" follows the World Christian Encylopedia
considers linguistic rather than political characteristics.
[1982], which
With the exception of ANM, all data sources ultimately refer back to the relevant
national census documents.
Data sources:
Atlas Narodov Mira [1964], 1999 Belarussian census (online), 2000 Finnish census
(online), Europa World Yearbook [1989], Population Index [1940], 2001 Ukrainian
census (online), Iwaskiw and of Congress. Federal Research Division. [1996], Mauldin
and Akers [1954], de Statistic (Romania) and Manuila [1938].
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